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IntroductIon
When Barbie and Ken divorce, they probably think about who gets their 
dream home, how they will share custody of their children, and how they will move 
forward with their lives. They may not have the time, energy, or knowledge for 
tax planning. Despite this reality, Congress has created a tax system that expects 
couples to engage in tax planning as they divorce. Congress encourages tax planning 
because it decided that divorce is a time when taxpayers should be given flexibility 
to determine who owes tax on the dissolved couple’s income.1 If divorcing couples 
engage in this planning, some couples may minimize their collective taxes. But this 
opportunity is only available for couples with children or an unequal division of 
assets and earnings. And those couples must make tax efficient property transfers 
and support payments.2 Thus, divorce as a tax-planning event is a targeted tax 
reduction that, through its operation, creates tax winners and losers.
1.     See infra Part I.
2.     Divorce mitigates the marriage penalty that spouses with relatively equal earnings paid 
when married, which is certainly a financial benefit, but not the same as the extension of tax 
benefits discussed in this Article. 
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. E-mail: stephanie.mcmahon@
uc.edu. I would like to thank Alice Abreu, Anthony Infanti, Marjorie Kornhauser, Ajay Meh-
rotra, Ted Seto, Nancy Shurtz, participants at the 2014 Law and Society Conference, and par-
ticipants at the 2014 Indiana Journal of Law & Social Equality Symposium, especially our 
wonderful hosts at the Maurer School of Law at Indiana University. Finally, this project could 
not have been completed without the financial assistance of the Harold C. Schott Foundation.
Despite the fact that some couples may enjoy significant tax savings 
following divorce, federal taxation has little to do with what most people think of 
when they think of divorce. Attitudes towards big-picture questions, such as why 
do so many marriages end in divorce or whether spouses owe each other anything 
after marriage, often color our views of what is an unrelated question: How should 
the government tax payments following divorce? Family law objectives differ from 
tax law principles and should be recognized as different. The question with respect 
to taxation is whether Congress should reduce the taxes of divorcing couples and, if 
so, how should the reduction be distributed between spouses? It is the latter question 
that is the focus of this Article.
Reframing the question as a comparison of divorcing couples against other 
taxpayers, and not simply as between spouses, produces a more equitable tax 
system. To justify a targeted tax reduction upon divorce, there must be a reason this 
group receives special government aid. Consequently, the aid should be targeted 
to accomplishing that objective. Divorce is a difficult time financially for many 
couples, so it may be appropriate to extend tax relief to at least some divorcing 
couples.3 As a form of tax relief, and not an essential component of the tax system, 
any tax reduction upon divorce must be equitable both between spouses and among 
taxpayers generally. 
Existing tax relief for some, but not all, divorcing couples is problematic. 
If there is something special about divorce that deserves a tax break, every couple, 
or at least couples in financial need, should enjoy tax reduction upon divorce. That 
does not currently happen. Under current law, tax reduction is not tied to need but 
to the tax planning and relative tax positions of the divorcing spouses.
Additionally, current law’s tax reduction (as compared to prior law) is of the 
couple’s collective taxes. Through shifting the taxation of income from the payer of 
property and support to the recipient, the payer owes less in tax while the recipient 
owes more. If the recipient is in a lower tax bracket than the payer, this can result 
in lower collective taxes. Importantly, the structure of the savings is that the payer 
enjoys all of the tax reduction unless the recipient negotiates for a larger pre-tax 
amount. The wealthier spouse may capture the tax reduction under existing law, 
leaving the recipient worse off under the existing form of tax reduction.
Because of who are generally payers and recipients of divorce-related 
payments, divorce-related taxation carries with it issues of class and gender. 
Existing law increases the tax on recipient spouses and gives tax reduction to the 
payer spouse with a goal of leaving more for the spouses to negotiate over. This 
backhand way of helping couples in divorce does nothing for those spouses who 
are truly poor and leaving poor marriages. In the conflict between class and gender, 
relatively well-off women recipients may benefit from existing law, but low-income 
wives from low-income marriages do not. This Article argues that this class-based 
result is a bad form of the intended tax benefit.
3.     See infra note 95.
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In other contexts, scholars debate whether Congress should address 
nonrevenue objectives through the tax code.4 When the focus of the tax provision 
appears evident, such as healthcare penalties and green energy credits, one can 
question whether the objective is good, whether the IRS should administer the 
program, or whether the provision promotes the desired change in behavior. This 
Article furthers this research agenda by examining a case in which interested groups 
misinterpret Congress’s limited objectives for targeted tax reduction.5 In this case 
of limited congressional objectives (tax reduction) but broader societal objectives 
(helping divorcing spouses and children of divorce), this Article questions whether 
these other nonrevenue objectives are furthered by the targeted tax reduction. 
Part II of this Article examines three sets of complex tax rules for divorcing 
couples: (1) on transfers between former spouses; (2) on payments of child support; 
and (3) with tax rates, deductions, and credits associated with divorcing couples’ 
children. Part III examines the premises of existing divorce-related tax provisions. 
Divorce-related tax provisions shift the tax burden for income from payer spouses 
to recipient spouses. This shifting of tax burdens may—or may not—reduce a 
couple’s collective taxes depending upon their relative tax positions, but it can also 
produce higher collective tax burdens. And in an era when the law is recognizing 
a growing number of relationships and the percentage of the population that is 
legally married is declining, the existence of a tax preference for this group is 
less justifiable. Although other relationships may end, only with divorce can its 
members enjoy this targeted tax reduction.
To the extent Congress continues to recognize divorce as a time-deserving 
tax reduction (not necessarily the best result, as discussed in Part III), an improved 
form of aid for divorcing couples can be created. This Article proposes targeted 
tax reduction to lower-income divorced spouses, instead of the existing regime 
benefiting the wealthier spouse. In place of existing tax-shifting, nonrecognition 
of appreciation on property transfers, and transferability of child-based benefits, 
tax reduction should be focused on the spouse in financial need relative to other 
4.     This debate is almost as old as the tax system. See Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A 
Reassessment, 1988 duke L.J. 1155 (1988); Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public 
Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 
Yale L.J. 1165 (1993). Compare Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implement-
ing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. l. 
rev. 705 (1970) (arguing “that the tax incentive is generally inferior to the direct subsidy as 
a means of achieving social goals”), with Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a 
Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 Harv. l. rev. 925 (1967) (contending “that neutral, scientific 
measure of taxable income is a mirage”). 
5.     E.g., Walter WadlIngton & raYmond c. o’BrIen, FamIlY laW In PersPectIve 107 
(2001); Stacia Gawronski, Spousal Support Under the Internal Revenue Code, 20 J. contemP. 
legal Issues 63 (2012); Carole Gould, Simplifying the Nation’s Divorce Laws, N.Y. tImes 
(May 19, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/05/19/business/personal-finance-simplifying-
the-nation-s-divorce-laws.html.
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taxpayers. Therefore, for a period of time following divorce, low-income divorcing 
spouses should receive a tax credit to help them transition to their non-marital 
status. Transferors of property, which the transferors owned and controlled before 
the divorce, should owe tax on any appreciation of that property as of the divorce, 
but payable over a period of time. This prevents the recipient spouse from owing 
tax on appreciation the payer enjoyed. Finally, child-based tax benefits should no 
longer be viewed as property, but as a means to aid the child, and should therefore 
be tied to custody of the child. Treating divorced spouses as separate taxpayers as 
this proposal does, rather than extending favorable marriage treatment to them, 
creates simpler rules that are more likely to help lower-income spouses and the 
children of divorce.
This examination of divorce-related taxation emphasizes the importance of 
narrowly tailoring tax policies to broader, nonrevenue goals as opposed to viewing 
tax reduction as an end in itself. If we want to reduce social and economic inequality, 
as is the focus of this Symposium, this Article concludes that tax reduction is not 
a valid substitute for measuring whether the law accomplishes these nonrevenue 
policy objectives. 
I. current laW
Divorce-related tax provisions are currently scattered throughout the 
Internal Revenue Code (“the Code”) because divorce produces many different 
types of taxable transactions. These transactions have been taxed in many different 
ways in the past. Currently, Congress mitigates most taxes upon divorce. In fact, 
Congress has structured many of the tax provisions so that divorcing couples can 
minimize their collective taxes. By allowing couples to have the lower-income 
spouse pay tax on income or to transfer tax benefits to the higher-income spouse, 
more income stays in the higher-income spouse’s hands as opposed to going to the 
government. Nothing in the Code ensures a redistribution of any of the tax savings 
to the lower-income spouse. 
There are three main types of divorce-related tax provisions. First, divorcing 
couples may divide accumulated property, make future payments to divide marital 
property, compensate a spouse for unpaid work performed during the marriage, 
or provide for a financially vulnerable spouse. With different tax consequences 
depending upon the type of transfer, there is flexibility to structure payments to 
minimize tax. Second, divorcing couples with children may (but do not always) 
owe child support. Payment for the care of children is only taxed as child support 
in limited circumstances. Finally, divorcing parents are given opportunities to 
designate who claims children for some tax benefits. For example, a child’s personal 
tax exemption, and with it the child tax credit, can be transferred between parents, 
but the child cannot be transferred for purposes of qualifying for the earned income 
tax credit (EITC) and head-of-household status. With respect to each set of rules, for 
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couples to maximize their collective tax reduction, divorcing spouses must make 
rational decisions, sometimes years in advance, regarding their financial positions 
and the law that will apply at that future date. 
A. Transfers Between Former Spouses
Divorce may trigger two types of transfers between spouses to settle 
property and any ongoing support obligation.6 First, a spouse may transfer to the 
other spouse some amount of the property accumulated during the marriage that is 
either held in one spouse’s name or jointly owned. Equal divisions of accumulated 
property are endorsed, at least in theory, in all the states, but debates remain over 
what should be considered accumulated property to be divided, particularly whether 
increased earning capacity is property that should be split.7 Second, one spouse 
may be obligated to make payments going forward to help support the other spouse, 
generally based on the recipient’s need and the payer’s ability to pay. State family 
law may require these payments of alimony, but the requirement has fallen out of 
favor.8 These two different types of payments have different tax consequences under 
current law, although it is relatively easy for wealthier couples to color payments as 
one or the other if divorcing spouses choose to do so.
Currently, the federal government taxes property settlements between 
divorcing spouses the same way it taxes tax-free gifts, hence no current taxation.9 
Neither the payer nor the recipient owes tax on the transfer; however, the recipient 
takes the payer’s basis in the property and, generally, that basis is used to calculate 
the recipient’s tax gain or loss when the recipient disposes of the property.10 In other 
words, federal law defers taxation on property settlements, but any built-in tax 
gain or loss as of the transfer may be taxed later to the recipient when the recipient 
sells or otherwise disposes of the transferred property. This provision’s greatest 
impact is on transfers of appreciated property (for example, the family’s investment 
portfolio) because of the tax benefit of deferral. This provision has no effect on 
transfers of cash or property that has neither appreciated nor depreciated; the payer 
spouse (or the couple) has already been taxed on that cash or property.11 
This favorable tax deferral was not always available. Before 1984, the Code 
had no rules for this circumstance. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Davis, 
6.     These transfers have different theoretical justifications, which are beyond the purview of 
federal income taxation.
7.     Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 colum. l. rev. 75, 
100–01, 106–12 (2004). This is made more complicated nationally because nine states are 
community property and the other states are common law.
8.     Id. at 119.
9.     I.R.C. § 1041(a)–(b) (2012).
10.     I.R.C. § 1001(e)(1) (2012).
11.     The recipient spouse could be taxed as receiving income. See infra Part III.
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ruled that transfers of property as a result of divorce were realization events that 
required the payer to recognize any appreciation in the transferred property.12 The 
recipient spouse owed no tax on the transfer on the theory she traded a right to marital 
support for the transferred property. As a result of Davis, if a recipient spouse did 
not have a state property interest in transferred appreciated property, the transfer 
was a taxable event to the payer, generally the wealthier spouse.13 One potential 
side effect of the Davis rule was a liquidity problem for payers who transferred 
significant amounts of appreciated property. On the other hand, recipient spouses 
often had a larger basis in transferred property so that they would owe less tax if 
they later disposed of their new assets.14 
The American Bar Association (ABA) called for the legislative repeal of 
Davis, arguing that divorce should not be a taxable event, specifically, not to a 
husband as payer or to a wife who marries a wealthy spouse and earns “valuable 
support rights.” By labeling the Davis result a taxable event, the ABA obscured 
the issue—it was not an additional tax, but timing of the tax.15 Only gain would be 
taxable, and that gain, if not taxable to the payer at divorce, would likely be taxable 
later to the recipient.16
Without floor debate and after only one hearing, Congress reversed Davis 
in 1984 as part of major changes to divorce-related taxation.17 Focusing on the 
payer, Congress mandated deferral and then taxation to the recipient in order to 
prevent “harsh consequences, often placing a tax burden on top of heavy alimony 
12.     370 U.S. 65 (1962).
13.     Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158; Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213; Rev. Rul. 74-
347, 1974-2 C.B. 26.
14.     Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63.
15.     Valentine Brookes, Report of the Committee on Domestic Relations Tax Problems, sec. 
tax’n Bull., July 1996, at 62, 63–66 (1966). The Report noted that overruling Davis means 
a wife is taxed on her husband’s appreciation because she receives her husband’s lower basis. 
“Why should she be made to pay tax on the husband’s profit?” Id. at 66. No answer has yet 
been given.
16.     Others have recognized the injustice created by taxing the recipient on appreciation 
generated while the property was owned by the payer. E.g., Leon Gabinet, Section 1041: The 
High Price of Quick Fix Reform in Taxation of Interspousal Transfers, 5 am. J. tax Pol’Y 13, 
39 (1986) (worrying that payers will leverage property prior to transfer); C. Garrison Lepow, 
Tax Policy for Lovers and Cynics: How Divorce Settlement Became the Last Tax Shelter in 
America, 62 notre dame l. rev. 32, 59 (1986) (proposing equal division of tax liability). 
Some scholars dismiss the concern, assuming people “act rationally and take account of obvi-
ous considerations that are economically detrimental to them.” Michael Asimow, The Assault 
on Tax-Free Divorce: Carryover Basis and Assignment of Income, 44 tax l. rev. 64, 74 
(1988).
17.     Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 421, 98 Stat. 494. For a discus-
sion of the political process, see Barb Mattei, 1984 Deficit Reduction Act: Divorce Taxation, 
1986 WIsc. l. rev. 177, 194 (1986); Marjorie A. O’Connell, The Domestic Relations Tax 
Reform Act: How We Got It and What We Can Do About It, 18 Fam. L.Q. 473, 473 (1985).
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and support obligations.”18 Although the Senate initially objected to this, it accepted 
tax deferral as a political means of limiting further expansions of tax relief upon 
divorce.19 Tax reduction for payers thus won the day.
Unlike property settlements that generally conclude at the divorce or 
shortly thereafter, alimony implies an ongoing obligation between former spouses. 
Recently, state law has limited alimony awards.20 For example, Massachusetts 
abolished lifetime spousal support, and Texas limits alimony awards to a three-
year maximum period and an amount capped at 20% of a payer’s gross income or 
$2,500 per month.21 Alimony is often further limited by actual payment. Although 
definitive data is lacking, research suggests that noncompliance is significantly 
over 50%, and thus it is common for payments not to be made at all or for less than 
the amount ordered by the court.22 
Despite the reality of nonpayment, the Code only provides for payment and 
ignores a recipient’s empty wallet by failing to grant a loss or bad debt deduction. 
The default is that the payer of alimony deducts the amounts actually paid, so 
that the payer is not taxed on these amounts, and the recipient pays tax on the 
income received.23 Thus, as with appreciation in property transfers, alimony is only 
taxed once to the recipient, but the recipient of alimony does not enjoy transferred 
property’s deferral.
Not every payment you might think of as alimony—and not even some 
labeled alimony—qualify as alimony for tax purposes. Regardless of state law 
definitions, six statutory requirements must be met for alimony tax treatment.24 
First, payments must be in cash. Second, payments must be made “under a divorce 
18.     Tax Law Simplification and Improvement Act of 1983: Hearing on H.R. 3475 Before 
the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 98th Cong. 152 (1983) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 3475] 
(statement of Ronald Perlman, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the 
Treasury). The House of Representatives also worried that expecting the payer to pay the tax 
opened the system to abuse because the IRS may not be alerted to the transfer until after the 
statute of limitations as to the payer had lapsed. H.r. reP. 98-861, at 1116 (1984); H.r. reP. 98-
432, at 191 (1984). There was no mention in the congressional record of the ABA’s argument 
that the person who consumes the income should pay tax on it. aBa domestIc relatIons tax 
sImPlIFIcatIon task Force, tHe “Income sHIFtIng” PrIncIPle In ProPosals For sImPlIFIcatIon oF 
domestIc relatIons tax laW 1, 4 (1983) [hereinafter “Income sHIFtIng”].
19.     See Mattei, supra note 17, at 193 n.120.
20.     See Judith G. McMullen, Alimony: What Social Science and Popular Culture Tell Us 
About Women, Guilt, and Spousal Support After Divorce, 19 duke J. gender l. & Pol’Y 41, 
47 (2011).
21.     Alicia Brokars Kelly, Actualizing Intimate Partnership Theory, 50 Fam. ct. rev. 258, 
265 (2012); Jennifer Levitz, Massachusetts Sets Limits on Alimony, Wall street J., Sept. 27, 
2011, available at National Newspapers Core.
22.     Constance L. Shehan, Felix M. Berardo, Erica Owens & Donna H. Berardo, Alimony: 
An Anomaly in Family Social Science, 51 Fam. rel. 308, 312 (2002).
23.     I.R.C. §§ 71, 215 (2012).
24.     I.R.C. § 71.
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or separation instrument.” Third, the payer and recipient must not be members of 
the same household at the time of the payment. Fourth, payments must terminate 
upon the death of the recipient. Fifth, the payments must not be taxed as child 
support, as discussed in the next Part. Finally, parties must not have opted out of 
alimony treatment.25 
Determining whether a particular arrangement between divorcing spouses 
satisfies these requirements may require litigation. Sometimes the law is stretched 
to produce a common sense result and, at other times, the technicalities of the law 
belie common sense. For example, in one case a husband paid his wife $215,000 at 
their divorce agreement’s signing.26 The husband deducted the payment as alimony, 
and the wife excluded it as a property settlement, clearly an improper tax result 
with no one paying tax on the income.27 In order to tax what looked like a property 
settlement as a property settlement, the Tax Court denied the husband the deduction 
because the legal obligation did not terminate if the wife died between the signing 
of the agreement and the payment, even though they happened at the same meeting. 
In other cases, courts have relied on the same requirement to hold that payments 
for the other spouse’s medical bills or car repairs, which appear on their face to be 
support payments, are taxable as property settlements because neither the law nor the 
agreement stopped the payments if the recipient died.28 If termination of a payment 
is not laid out in the agreement, courts defer to state law for whether the obligation 
survives the recipient’s death, even though state legislatures were unlikely to have 
considered the tax ramifications when enacting these family property laws.
Alimony’s last requirement permits a divorcing couple to agree that the 
payer owes the tax and the recipient receives payments tax-free. No one maintains 
records as to the frequency of this election, but based on the limited litigation and 
guidance issued, it does not appear this option is used often: there are only
25.     Id.
26.     Webb v. Comm’r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1024 (1990). 
27.     Clear-cut rules are necessary to protect government revenue. The alternative is that tax-
payers will game the system. See Cook v. Comm’r, 80 T.C. 512 (1983), aff’d mem., 742 F.2d 
1431 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding not taxable to husband on transfer); Cook v. United States, 904 
F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding wife receives stepped-up basis and that the Second Circuit 
was incorrect).
28.     Preston v. Comm’r, 209 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2000); Hoover v. Comm’r, 69 
T.C.M. (CCH) 2466 (1995). One alternative would be for courts to read that the expense 
creating the obligation must occur before the death of the recipient spouse, but precedent has 
likely precluded that reading.
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twelve cases and four Treasury Department rulings on point.29 Nevertheless, some 
recipient spouses would be wise to use this alternate treatment because more than 
tax on the income may be at stake. For example, tax receipt of alimony can affect 
whether a recipient is entitled to the child tax credit, the EITC, and other deductions 
and credits that are capped by the claimant’s taxable income. By increasing the 
recipient’s income, alimony might cause some recipients to lose these valuable tax 
benefits when they would not be lost if the payer had agreed to pay the tax. 
The current default, much less its electivity, was not always the law. In 
Gould v. Gould, the Supreme Court decided the taxation of alimony in terms of 
property law, not tax law.30 Based on a narrower reading of income than is used 
today, alimony was determined to be part of the husband’s income, to which the 
wife had an equitable right.31 Therefore, the husband owed tax on alimony paid but 
the wife did not owe tax on the alimony she received because it was, in a sense, 
already hers. The Revenue Act of 1942 overruled Gould, which made the recipient 
taxable on alimony and gave the payer a deduction.32 Congress’s stated objective 
was to relieve payers of hardship from the high World War II tax rates, when top 
marginal rates reached 90%.33 Congress was concerned that “in many cases the 
husband would not have sufficient income left after paying alimony to meet his 
income tax obligations.”34 The 1942 change was to “correct this situation” and 
29.     Richardson v. Comm’r, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1390 (2012); Linzy v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 482 (2011); Proctor v. Comm’r, 129 T.C. 92 (2007); Simpson v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 470 (2003); Jaffe v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2167 (1999); Medlin v. Comm’r, 76 
T.C.M. (CCH) 707 (1998); Ambrose v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2429 (1996); Kouskoutis 
v. Comm’r, No. 496–11S, T.C. Summ. Op. 2012-64 (2012) (Westlaw); Shiley v. Comm’r, No. 
13418–09S, T.C. Summ. Op. 2011-11 (2011) (Westlaw); Nahhas v. Comm’r, No. 3235–05S, 
T.C. Summ. Op. 2007-28 (2007) (Westlaw); Vanarsdall v. Comm’r, No. 7943–04S, T.C. 
Summ. Op. 2005-170 (2005) (Westlaw); Tobkin v. Comm’r, No. 6646–00S, T.C. Summ. Op. 
2004-42 (2004) (Westlaw); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-38-008 (2006); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
2001-41-036 (2001); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-10-019 (1996); I.R.S. Non Docketed Serv. Rev. 
9303 (1990).
30.     245 U.S. 151 (1917).
31.     Id. at 153–54 (citing Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 577 (1901)).
32.     Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 120(a)–(b), 56 Stat. 798, 816–17.
33.     H.r. reP. no. 77-2333, at 46 (1942). See also Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings 
on H.R. 7378 Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 77th Cong. 92 (1942) (statement of 
Randolph Paul, Tax Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury). One theory posits that the 1942 
shift of the taxation of alimony but not child support was because obligations to support chil-
dren “might have been considered to be stronger” than obligations to support wives. Deborah 
A. Geier, Simplifying and Rationalizing the Federal Income Tax Law Applicable to Transfers 
in Divorce, 55 tax laW. 363, 372 (2002). Based on Congress’s concern that payers would 
have insufficient funds after paying alimony, I posit that Congress might have distinguished 
child support, which a payer would owe regardless of the divorce because the child would 
have demanded similar resources.
34.     H.r. reP. no. 77-2333, at 46.
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was thus focused solely on the payer.35 In 1984, alimony’s tax treatment was made 
elective by allowing taxpayers to opt out of the 1942 arrangement.36 With this tax 
reduction, the conference report concludes that divorced couples might owe less in 
collective taxes than before or during marriage.37 Nothing is said about who should, 
or would, enjoy these savings. 
Because the tax treatment of property settlements and alimony differ (either as 
a deferral of the tax on transferred property’s appreciation, or as a current deduction for 
the payer and an inclusion in income by the alimony recipient), spouses are expected 
to work together to minimize their collective taxes, as discussed further in Part III. 
This expectation exists despite the ABA’s assurance in 1966 that “[r]arely, if ever, are 
tax shifting purposes dominant in divorces.”38 Tax planning upon divorce is also not 
unfettered. Congress created a recapture provision that undoes the favorable alimony 
taxation if the couple front-loads “alimony” payments in an effort to avoid property 
settlement taxation.39 Thus, Congress kept some distinction, and denied complete 
flexibility, between alimony and property settlements. This also means the IRS is 
left to police the distinction between rules created as a political compromise aimed at 
collective tax reduction.
B. Child Support
Over one-quarter of all children living in the United States live in one-parent 
households.40 Almost half of these children are entitled to child support.41 Sadly, less 
than half of custodial parents receive the full amount of child support they are owed, 
and one-quarter do not receive any of the child support to which they are legally 
35.     Id.
36.     Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 422, 98 Stat. 494, 795–97. See 
also H.R. reP. no. 98-861, at 1116 (1984) (Conf. Rep.). The House wanted to allow taxpay-
ers to decide, within certain broad limits, who would be taxable on transfers; the Senate Fi-
nance Committee advocated elimination of the alimony deduction. O’Connell, supra note 17, 
at 494–97; Mattei, supra note 17, at 193 n.120. The Finance Committee tried to get women’s 
groups to support elimination of the alimony deduction, also advocated in Part IV. Marjorie 
O’Connell, a member of the ABA’s Task Force on this issue, met with these groups to urge 
them that the deduction allowed payers to meet their spousal support obligation. O’Connell, 
supra note 17, at 494–97.
37.     H.r. reP. no. 98-432, at 194 (1983). The House approved that “an overall tax sav-
ings generally results because the payer is normally in a higher marginal tax bracket than the 
payee.” Id.
38.     Brookes, supra note 15, at 63.
39.     I.R.C. § 22(k) (1942); H.r. reP. no. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1496–98.
40.     tImotHY grall, census Bureau, custodIal motHers and FatHers and tHeIr cHIld 
suPPort: 2011, at 2 (2013). Child support is not contingent upon marriage. Of the 81.7% of 
custodial parents who are women, more than one-third have never been married. Id. at 2–4.
41.     There are 7.3 million custodial parents who do not have formal or informal agreements 
regarding child support. Id. at 5.
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entitled.42 This poor record exists despite the median annual child support award 
being $4,800, or $400 per month.43 Unlike with property settlements and alimony, the 
tax treatment of child support has not changed over the years. Payers of child support 
do not receive a deduction for payments to custodial parents, and recipients do not 
include child support in their income. Arguably, this creates a disincentive to pay 
child support as opposed to alimony, which is tax-advantaged for the payer. In part 
in reaction to this tax result, courts and Congress have given divorcing parents some 
flexibility in classifying payments as child support or as alimony.44
Congress has long supported the existing tax treatment of child support 
because of concerns with the alternative.45 For parents who share custody of a child, 
there is no tax deduction for the costs incurred for the care of the child beyond the 
child’s personal exemption, the child tax credit, and other credits discussed later in 
this Part.46 To grant a privilege to child support would create an economic benefit 
for divorced parents compared to joint custodial parents. In order to not create 
a new benefit, the payer does not receive a deduction and the recipient does not 
include child support payments in income.47 
Because of the differences in the tax treatment of child support and alimony 
(child support taxed to the payer and alimony taxed to the recipient), questions arise 
whether payments are alimony or child support. Periodic payments for the support 
of a former wife and child, as opposed to being for the child alone, are taxable 
as alimony and not child support.48 Therefore, family maintenance payments are 
taxable to the recipient and deductible by the payer. This favorable rule for payers 
is often referred to as the Lester rule, after Commissioner v. Lester, in which the 
Supreme Court gave judicial sanction to the minimization of taxable child support 
because no part of the case’s “family support payment” was “fixed” as child 
support.49 The Court reported, “Congress was in effect giving the husband and wife 
the power to shift a portion of the tax burden from the wife to the husband by the 
42.     Id. at 1. Although mothers are more likely to be entitled to child support, mothers and 
fathers are equally likely to be behind on their payments. Id. at 9.
43.     Id. at 11. Of the amounts actually received, the median is $2,400 annually, or about 
$200 per month. Id.
44.     In 1984, Congress continued the earlier rule that if a payer is delinquent in payments, 
the first amounts paid is attributable to child support rather than alimony. H.r. reP. no. 98-
861, at 1117 (1984).
45.     See H.r. reP. no. 77-2333, at 46 (1942); H.r. reP. no. 98-432, at 1494 (1984).
46.     The tax system provides no relief in the event of non-payment of child support or 
alimony. Rev. Rul. 93-27, 1993-1 C.B. 32; Perry v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 470 (1989); Swenson v. 
Comm’r, 43 T.C. 897 (1965). See also Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Role 
Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 stan. l. rev. 695, 714 (2007).
47.     I.R.C. § 71(c)(1) (2012). This treatment presumes the recipient parent does not benefit 
from the funds received. If a custodial parent benefits from child support, he or she could 
arguably pay taxes on some amount of child support as alimony.
48.     s. reP. no. 77-1631, at 86 (1942). 
49.     366 U.S. 299 (1961), aff’g 279 F.2d 354 (1960).
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use of a simple provision in the settlement agreement.”50 Since the last round of 
legislative changes, the Tax Court has ruled that it will not look into unallocated 
family support payments to determine how much it should view as child support;51 
thus, there is no requirement that any amount be taxable as child support, despite 
the presence of children.
When Congress acted in 1984, it expanded the definition of taxable child 
support, but not to the extent to abrogate spouses’ choice. In conference, Congress 
expanded child support to include not only payments “fixed” as child support, 
but also payments contingent upon events related to a child, or at a time clearly 
associated with such a contingency.52 The expansion makes it more likely that 
income is taxed as child support because it is harder for parents to change the 
tax consequences without changing their economic arrangement. Whether child 
support exists for tax purposes depends on how parents designate and shape their 
obligations to each other.53 Throughout the limited congressional discussion, there 
was no mention of the welfare of the child or any desire to use the tax system to 
improve the child’s welfare.
Thus, existing rules regarding payments made for the care of children, as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court and the Treasury Department, place great weight 
on the labeling and structuring of payments. These rules provide tax-planning 
opportunities to divorcing couples to choose their preferred tax result without 
necessarily providing greater support for children or the custodial parent.54 Despite 
the fact that these groups are often in financial need, Congress limited their aid with 
this tax reduction.
C. Tax Rates, Deductions, and Credits
All taxpayers must annually calculate the amount of taxes they owe, and 
divorced spouses must each file a tax return.55 Filing is often more complicated for
50.     Id. at 304 (emphasis added).
51.     Simpson v. Comm’r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 191 (1999); Lawton v. Comm’r, 78 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 153 (1999) (mother’s EITC contingent upon child support characterization).
52.     I.R.C. § 71(c); H.r. reP. no. 98-861, at 1, 117 (1984) (Conf. Rep.). During congressio-
nal debates over the tax treatment of divorce in 1984, Congress initially ignored child support 
to such an extent that the Chair of the ABA Tax Section stated that he presumed Lester to be 
retained. Hearing on H.R. 3475, supra note 18, at 210 (statement of M. Bernard Aidinoff, 
Chair, Section on Taxation, American Bar Association).
53.     For examples of other planning opportunities, see Wendy S. Goffe, Estate Planning 
with Trusts for Divorcing Spouses, 38 Fam. L.Q. 157, 163–64 (2004).
54.     States often do not differentiate payments. Judith McMullen & Deborah Oswald, Why 
Do We Need a Lawyer?, 12 J. L. & FamIlY stud. 57 (2010).
55.     I.R.C. § 6012 (2012).
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divorcing parents because the tax system contains child-based tax benefits.56 First, 
the Code provides a personal exemption deduction for qualifying children equal in 
amount to an adult’s exemption.57 Whoever claims a child’s personal exemption is 
also entitled to the child tax credit and certain other tax benefits associated with that 
child. Second, the Code provides a greater EITC for low-income but wage-earning 
custodial parents.58 The size of the credit increases with the number of children, 
up to three, that the custodial parent has. Third, the Code allows an unmarried 
custodial parent to file as a head of household. Not only does head-of-household 
status provide favorable tax rate brackets as compared to individual filers, it also 
increases the size of the standard deduction.59 Because some benefits may be 
transferred by spousal agreement, the resulting system allows divorcing parents to 
maximize their child’s tax benefits. 
Congress grants divorce-specific flexibility for some, but not all, child-
based benefits, and that flexibility results in complexity for divorcing couples who 
try to maximize their tax reduction. The complexity does not exist for non-divorced 
parents. For non-divorced parents, the same person must claim all child-based 
benefits, so it is an all-or-nothing choice.60 That is not required of divorced parents; 
instead, some benefits may be split from the rest. Regardless of divorce, a child 
cannot be transferred for either head-of-household status or the EITC calculation 
56.     In 2004, Congress standardized the definition of “qualifying child” used in each provi-
sion, although not the age requirements the provisions impose. Working Families Tax Relief 
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, §201, 118 Stat. 1166. To be a qualifying child, the person 
must satisfy a five-prong test. First, the individual must be the “child of the taxpayer;” a 
“descendant of such child;” or “a brother, sister, stepbrother, or stepsister of the taxpayer or a 
descendant of the sibling.” I.R.C. §§ 152(c)(1)(A), (c)(2) (2012). Legally adopted individu-
als are treated as children by blood. § 152(f)(1)(B). Eligible foster children are also included. 
§152(f)(1)(C). Brothers and sisters include siblings by half-blood. §152(f)(4). Second, the in-
dividual must have “the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half” 
of the year, although as shown infra this requirement is optional for some purposes. I.R.C. 
§152(c)(1)(B). Third, the individual must be younger than the taxpayer and either (1) not 
yet nineteen years old at the end of the year, or (2) be a “student” who is not yet twenty-four 
years old at the end of the year, although some tax provisions impose a younger age require-
ment. I.R.C. § 152(c)(3)(A)(i). There is an exception for individuals who are disabled. I.R.C. 
§ 152(c)(3)(B). Fourth, the individual cannot have provided over one-half of her own support 
for the year. I.R.C. § 152(c)(1)(D). Finally, the individual must not have filed a joint return for 
that year. I.R.C. § 152(c)(1)(E).
57.     I.R.C. § 152.
58.     Although a discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, eligibility for the EITC is 
based on custodial support and not parental status. I.R.C. § 32 (2012). The EITC is available 
to those without children, although the credit is significantly smaller. Rev. Proc. 13-15, 2013-
5 I.r.B. § 2.05.
59.     I.R.C. §§ 2(a), 63(c) (2012).
60.     See I.r.c. § 152. Until 2003, only after divorce could children’s personal exemptions 
be transferred between parents. Section 152(e) was extended to parents who were not previ-
ously married. King v. Comm’r, 121 T.C. 245 (2003).
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unless custody of the child is transferred. These tax benefits depend upon custody, 
as do the dependent care credit61 and the health insurance cost credit.62 On the other 
hand, in the event of a divorce the custodial parent can relinquish to the other 
parent the child’s personal exemption, and perhaps unknown to them, the parent 
who claims the exemption determines who may claim other tax benefits, such as 
the child tax credit, a credit for qualified tuition and related expenses,63 and a credit 
for coverage under a qualified health plan.64 
Today, a child’s personal exemption can be transferred between parents if 
the custodial parent signs a written declaration that he or she will not claim the 
child as a dependent.65 Thus, a custodial parent may transfer a child’s exemption to 
the noncustodial parent for any reason and regardless of whether support payments 
were made. With the election, divorce overrides the requirement that a qualifying 
child reside for more than half of the year with the claiming parent. Congress’s 
expectation was that this would maximize tax reduction and increase administrative 
convenience.66 The Treasury Department noted that when used, support-based tests 
for dependency exemptions were heavily litigated, and the House Report agreed 
with eliminating support-based tests because of the “subjective and present difficult 
problems of proof and substantiation.”67 Support was, therefore, deemed to be too 
much to require for a child’s exemption.
As a result of its transferability, legal confusion exists as to whether a 
child’s exemption is the parents’ tradable property. The Treasury Department does 
not permit court orders or separation agreements alone to transfer an exemption for 
fear that state courts may allocate exemptions in a manner inconsistent with federal 
law.68 Nevertheless, children’s personal exemptions are treated as marital assets by 
61.     I.R.C. § 24 (2012).
62.     I.R.C. § 35 (2012).
63.     I.R.C. § 25A(f) (2012).
64.     I.R.C. § 36B (2012). 
65.     I.R.C. § 152(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4(e)(1)(ii) (2014).
66.     See Hearing on H.R. 3475, supra note 18, at 154 (statement of Ronald Perlman, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the Treasury).
67.     Id. (stating that support claims composed 20% of the low income tax court cases); H.r. 
reP. no. 98-432, at 1497 (1984).
68.     H.r. reP. no. 98-432, at 1498; T.D. 9408, 2008-33 I.R.B. 3. The Treasury Department 
was concerned that “[d]ivorce decrees, separation agreements, and similar instruments are 
complex documents that may be subject to differing interpretations governed by state law. 
Allowing these documents to serve as a written declaration creates complexity and uncer-
tainty.” T.D. 9408, 2008-33 I.R.B. 3. The ABA agreed. sectIon oF taxatIon, aBa, comments 
concernIng ProPosed regulatIons under sectIon 152(e) oF tHe Internal revenue code 5 
(Sept. 19, 2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/tax/pubpolicy/2007/
070919proposedregsundersec152e.authcheckdam.pdf. However, one scholar suggests that the 
divorce agreement should be sufficient proof of an intent or obligation to shift exemptions. 
Robert G. Nassau, How to Split the Tax Baby: What Would Solomon Do?, 61 sYracuse l. 
rev. 83, 114–16 (2010).
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some family courts, as discussed in Part III, to be allocated between parents in the 
same way as other accumulated property. 
Not all tax benefits relating to qualifying children are transferrable in divorce 
and, therefore, severable from custody. The EITC and the head-of-household status 
are tied to custody of the child. Despite the custody limitation, maximization of tax 
reduction remains a goal of these provisions. For example, with respect to the EITC, 
when more than one person can claim a child, the law often demands allocation of 
the child to maximize tax reduction.69 If both parents meet the requirements to claim 
the child, the child is mandated to be the qualifying child of the parent with whom 
the child lived for the longer period of time during the year. If both parents lived 
with the child for the same amount of time, the child is mandated the qualifying 
child of the parent who had the higher adjusted gross income for the year.70 Thus, 
the rules create a default that may require the sharing of information regarding each 
spouse’s financial position. This default focuses on tax reduction as the goal, rather 
than provision for the child. 
Only with the head-of-household status does the tax benefit remain with 
the custodial parent and with a focus on support for the child. This status provides 
favorable tax rates and a larger standard deduction compared to filing as a single 
taxpayer.71 The wider tax brackets of head-of-household status results in more 
income being taxed at lower tax rates; a larger standard deduction allows more 
income not to be taxed.72 To qualify for head-of-household status, a taxpayer must 
not be married at the end of the year and must maintain a household that constitutes 
the principal place of abode for a qualifying child for more than one-half of the 
year.73 This latter requirement requires the taxpayer to furnish over one-half of the 
cost of household maintenance, and the child to reside with the person claiming the 
status.74 Head-of-household status cannot be transferred without transferring the 
child and the burden of support for that child.
Through the child-based tax provisions, Congress mixes a concern for 
children with a desire to grant parents tax reductions. For divorcing parents, there 
69.     Irs, PuBlIcatIon 596: earned Income credIt (eIc) 11–14 (Nov. 20, 2013), http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p596.pdf. If a parent and non-parent have lived with a child for at 
least six months and one day, thereby each meeting the statute’s requirements, the parent can 
choose to claim his or her child for purposes of the EITC. Id. at 12. 
70.     Id. at 12.
71.     See I.R.C. §§1, 63(c)(2)(B) (2012).
72.     See I.r.c. § 1. Although not all taxpayers claim the standard deduction, the major-
ity of them do. In 2011, 67.6% of taxpayers claimed the standard deduction. See Irs, soI 
tax stats—IndIvIdual Income tax returns PuBlIcatIon 1304 (comPlete rePort) tbl.A 
(2011), http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Individual-Income-Tax-Returns-Publica-
tion-1304-%28Complete-Report%29. The choice of standard deduction or itemized deduc-
tions is provided in I.R.C. § 63(a)–(d).
73.     I.R.C. § 2(b)(1) (2012).
74.     I.r.c. § 2(b)(1)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.2-2(b)(1) (2013).
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are often choices to be made to maximize the reduction. These choices are not 
always easy to make.75 Congress cut the tie between a child’s personal exemption 
and the other benefits tied to that exemption, producing a lack of consistency among 
these various provisions. During their divorce, former spouses should allocate the 
tax benefits that they can, as they remember the effects of the provisions that cannot 
be allocated between them. The choice may change over the years as their financial 
situations evolve. Without a crystal ball regarding their own (and their former 
spouses’) economic futures, transfers of a child’s tax benefits upon divorce can trap 
even the most wary. 
II. ProBlematIc PremIses 
This Part examines three premises of the existing tax treatment of divorce-
related events. First, these tax rules, intended to favor taxpayers, adopt a policy of 
shifting the tax burden of income from the higher-income spouse to the lower-income 
spouse. The objective is to reduce the couple’s collective taxes. Second, many of the 
rules permit, or require, implicit or explicit elections be made by divorcing spouses 
in order to minimize their collective taxes. Those who make the wisest elections owe 
less in tax. Third, because Congress has created these special rules for the taxation 
of divorce-related events, instead of allowing the general rules of taxation to apply, 
marriage is given special recognition denied to other relationships. 
Each facet of this tax policy unjustly limits who benefits from the tax 
reduction. Shifting the tax burden reduces collective taxes for only some divorcing 
couples, and not necessarily those couples who need tax relief the most. Moreover, 
especially because divorcing spouses are no longer a functioning couple, the 
sharing of any tax benefit between former spouses is not automatically equitable. 
Broadening the review of divorce-related taxation to include those couples who 
do not benefit from the relief, plus taxpayers not entitled to use these rules, should 
cause us to rethink existing law.
A. Tax Shifting
The tax benefit of divorce is most often created because soon-to-be former 
spouses shift the tax burden for income from a spouse in a higher tax bracket to 
one in a lower tax bracket. This shifting of taxation reduces a couple’s collective 
taxes. This can be accomplished by shifting taxation of income (as with alimony), 
shifting gain following the sale of property (as with some property settlements), or 
shifting deductions and credits that offset other income (as with children’s personal 
exemptions and the child tax credit). This tax shifting may have politically justified 
75.     See H.r. reP. no. 98-432, at 1499–1500 (1984). The Treasury Department allows both 
parents to claim a child for the health care expense deduction and a few other provisions. 
I.R.C. § 213(d)(5) (2012); Rev. Proc. 2008-48, 2008-36 I.R.B. 1.
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objectives. Nonetheless, as this Part will show, it has practically unjustified results.
When tax shifting generates tax reduction, its mechanics are straightforward. 
Consider Abe and Beth who divorce. Abe is expected to have significant amounts of 
income taxed in the 39.6% bracket; Beth is in the 10% tax bracket. In their divorce 
agreement, Abe agrees to pay Beth $5,000 per month for ten years, taxable as alimony. 
If Beth is taxed on the $5,000 payment, she owes $500 per month in taxes, but if 
Abe is taxed on the income, he owes $1,980 per month. As a result of the change 
in taxpayer for the alimony payment, $1,480 less is going to the government each 
month, and that “windfall” can be divided per the spouses’ negotiations. Similarly, 
if Beth transfers each of their three children’s $3,950 personal exemption to Abe, 
because of their different tax brackets, a combined $3,507.60 in taxes may be saved.76
Through the shifting of the tax burden, more income remains with the 
spouses because less revenue is paid to the government. Without the tax shifting, 
Beth would have owed less in tax, but the government would have taken a larger 
slice of Abe’s income, leaving less to be divided. After the application of the 
divorce-related provisions, Beth owes more in taxes, but there is more money left 
over—initially Abe’s. Thus, the shifting of taxes is often portrayed as an issue of 
collective taxes and not who pays the tax. Calculating the tax based on the lower-
income spouse’s rates creates the tax savings.
For both primary-earner and relatively equal-earner couples, the results of 
divorce without current divorce-related tax provisions would be the same as if the 
spouses had never married. Nevertheless, post-divorce tax shifting is accepted, 
at least in part, because of the perceived hardship that is caused by increasing 
couples’ taxes upon divorce.77 On one hand, primary-earner couples’ taxes increase 
following divorce as a result of the loss of the marriage bonuses: joint filing’s 
wider tax brackets and a number of other benefits reduce this group’s tax relative to 
their filing as individuals. These benefits are lost upon divorce for primary-earner 
couples: a divorce penalty. On the other hand, two relatively equal-earner couples 
do not enjoy the marriage bonus, but suffer higher collective taxes when they 
marry than if they filed as individuals: a marriage penalty. Following a divorce, the 
two-earner couple has a divorce bonus by eliminating the marriage penalty. It was 
distaste for increasing the former’s taxes relative to marriage that produced a tax 
benefit for this group alone.
Current divorce-related taxation continues the marital tax union for some 
couples. Primary-earner couples’ alimony payments allow the higher-income 
spouse to shift the associated tax burden to the lower-income spouse, extending the 
bonus that existed in marriage. The justification for continuing the bonus in divorce 
is, effectively, that once these taxpayers have a tax boon, divorce is a bad time to 
76.     An exemption is worth $395 (or $3,950 times 10%) to Beth but $1,564.20 ($3,950 
times 39.6%) to Abe. The difference of $1,169.20 per exemption is saved in collective taxes.
77.     For additional information regarding congressional history of alimony, see notes 33 
through 37, supra.
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take it away. This divorce bonus, and the alimony payments that create it, are less 
likely for relatively equal-earner couples, who are more likely to be in the same (or 
at least a closer) tax bracket.78
Tax shifting thus focuses not on the income per se but on the taxation of 
that income. “The question presented is not whether income should be shifted from 
one spouse or ex-spouse to the other, but whether the income that in fact is shifted 
between the parties by local law should or should not be taxed to the recipient.”79 
Congress, at least in its published reports, missed this important point. By labeling 
the gains from divorce as “income shifting,” one is less likely to realize the issue 
is shifting the tax burden associated with income transferred under family law, 
or shifting the ability to claim child-based benefits but without shifting the child. 
Thus, the focus should not be on the income or the child, but on who pays the tax. 
With little theoretical justification for what is more appropriately called 
“tax shifting,” the ABA expressed concern that, without it, taxpayers would simply 
find other methods to reduce their taxes.80 This concern that taxpayers will seek 
other means of tax avoidance could be made any time tax reduction is targeted. 
Nevertheless, assigning income to be taxed from lower-bracket taxpayers is 
generally prohibited, even though taxpayers have repeatedly found new means to 
do so. For example, in Lucas v. Earl,81 the Supreme Court prevented income shifting 
via contract from a wage earner to his lower-taxed wife. Similarly, in Helvering v. 
Horst,82 the Supreme Court disallowed the transfer of the taxes imposed on interest 
payments from the owner of the debt to his lower-taxed son. And much of partnership 
tax law has developed in an attempt to prevent partners from shifting income and 
deductions among them.83 Despite the general prohibition on tax shifting, in the 
divorce context, Congress not only permitted, but also legislated in favor of, this 
means of tax reduction.
It is impossible to determine how many couples use these provisions to 
reduce their taxes. With respect to transfers of appreciated property, the tax 
provisions are favorable to couples who lack liquidity and who understand the time 
value of deferring taxation; however, there is not a lot of property that is covered by 
78.     Among dual income spouses, the wife’s income has been found to have a significant 
moderate negative impact on the likelihood of an alimony award. Robert Kelly & Greer Fox, 
Determinants of Alimony Awards: An Empirical Test of Current Theories and a Reflection on 
Public Policy, 44 sYracuse l. rev. 641, 702 (1993).
79.     “Income sHIFtIng”, supra note 18, at 5.
80.     In 1982, members of Congress, in conjunction with an ABA Task Force, the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants Tax Divisions, and members of the Treasury Depart-
ment, considered repealing Sections 71 and 215, which permit shifting the tax burden associ-
ated with alimony. Id. at 1–2.
81.     281 U.S. 111 (1930).
82.     311 U.S. 112 (1940).
83.     I.R.C. § 704(b) (2012). See also alan gunn & James rePettI, PartnersHIP Income 
taxatIon 43–45 (2005) (examining the Congressional intent behind revisions to Rule 704).
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this rule. In 2010, the median net worth of U.S. families was $77,300.84 This caps 
for many the amount of unrealized appreciation that can be deferred in divorce. 
Moreover, 25% of Americans had a negative net worth.85 Of course, couples may 
have property encumbered by liabilities, and with married couples’ home ownership 
rate at almost 80%, it is likely that many divorcing couples have some property to 
transfer.86 As for alimony, in 2011, 583,411 returns deducted $10.7 billion paid in 
alimony.87 Much of the deduction benefited wealthy payers of alimony. Although 
taxpayers with adjusted gross income of $250,000 or greater represented only a 
little more than 11% of the returns claiming the alimony deduction, the amount 
they deducted represented more than 35% of the total alimony deductions.88 A few 
taxpayers have much at stake in their tax shifting arrangements. 
But, although all divorcing couples are subject to these tax provisions, only 
a subset of couples benefit from tax shifting, and those who may benefit are not 
necessarily more worthy. Not only do divorcing couples need sufficient appreciated 
property or the income to make alimony payments, the former spouses must be in 
different tax brackets or be entitled to different tax benefits so that the burden is 
transferred from a higher-taxed to a lower-taxed spouse. If neither spouse owes 
tax, there is no benefit to tax shifting. Similarly, if both spouses owe tax but are in 
the same tax bracket, there is no tax savings from shifting the tax burden from one 
spouse to the other. Hence, the benefit of tax shifting is based on the tax position 
of the spouses relative to each other, and not relative to other divorcing couples.89
There are also situations where tax shifting produces higher collective tax 
burdens for couples—certainly not what Congress intended. If income is taxable 
to a lower-income spouse, that spouse might lose tax benefits, such as the EITC 
or dependent care credit, because the increased income pushes the spouse above 
income thresholds. What the lower-income spouse suffers in higher taxes and lost 
benefits might be greater than what the other spouse saves in taxes.
Similarly, certain tax benefits have little value for some higher-income 
taxpayers. For example, personal exemptions are normally more valuable to higher-
bracket taxpayers than lower-bracket taxpayers because their value is the amount 
84.     Jesse Bricker, Arthur B. Kennickell, Kevin B. Moore & John Sabelhaus, Changes in 
U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 
90 Fed. res. Bull. 1, 17 (2012).
85.     Id.
86.     Id. at 43. 
87.     Irs, IndIvIdual Income tax returns 2012: PuBlIcatIon 1304, at 1, 2 tbl.A, http://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/12inalcr.pdf.
88.     Irs, all returns: sources oF Income, adJustments, and tax Items, BY sIze oF adJusted 
gross Income, tax Year 2012, at tbl.1.4, http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats---Individual-
Statistical-Tables-by-Size-of-Adjusted-Gross-Income.
89.     Men are increasingly the secondary earner within married couples and, therefore, the 
effects of tax shifting might soon favor women. rIcHard FrY & d’vera coHn, PeW researcH 
center, Women, men and tHe neW economIcs oF marrIage 1–2 (2010).
92
   Spring 2015                                                          Should Divorce Be More Taxing?
of the deduction multiplied by the taxpayer’s top marginal tax rate; however, 
Congress phases out personal exemptions at higher income levels under the regular 
income tax and has eliminated personal exemptions for purposes of the alternative 
minimum tax.90 Once exemptions are phased out, they produce no tax reduction 
for the taxpayer claiming them. But just because a child’s personal exemption has 
no value to one parent does not mean it can be allocated to the other; it is simply 
wasted. Thus, transferring the tax benefit to the wealthier spouse might result in 
no tax savings or even greater taxes owed if the lower income spouse could have 
benefited by the exemption. 
The same type of tax wastage can occur with child-based tax credits. 
Although tax credits reduce the amount of tax owed dollar for dollar and are 
generally of equal value to all taxpayers, there are two situations this would not 
be the case—one which suggests allocating credits to the higher-income spouse 
and one which suggests allocating credits to the lower-income spouse. First, if the 
credit is not refundable and one spouse has no tax obligation, credits do not provide 
any tax benefit. Consequently, if the sole goal is tax reduction, the better choice is 
to allocate nonrefundable credits to the higher-income spouse, who is more likely 
to owe some amount of tax.91 Refundable tax credits, on the other hand, provide 
some benefit to qualifying recipients without a tax obligation. Certain of these 
credits, including the child tax credit, also phase out and, therefore, have limited or 
no value for high-income taxpayers. Because of these limitations with the credits 
themselves, if the goal is to minimize collective taxes, it may or may not be optimal 
for transferable credits to be transferred to a higher-income or lower-income spouse 
depending on their relative tax situations.
These complex tax consequences need to be considered in their entirety at 
the time of the divorce to engage in effective tax planning, but the consequences are 
not always knowable. Consider the settlement of appreciated property: Couples who 
transfer appreciated property as part of their property settlement should negotiate 
their settlements in anticipation of the taxes imposed on the sale of the property. 
To illustrate, a couple jointly owns an investment portfolio worth $100,000 and in 
which the couple had invested a principal amount of $50,000. Before the transfer, 
the couple has a $50,000 tax basis for determining taxable gain or loss. In the 
divorce, the husband transfers his half of the portfolio to the wife. Under Davis, 
the husband would be taxed on his $25,000 share of the $50,000 of appreciation 
when he transferred his interest in the portfolio. The wife’s basis going forward 
for determining her tax consequences on a sale of the investment asset would be 
$75,000: her share of the original $25,000 investment plus a $50,000 cost basis 
from acquiring her husband’s half of the portfolio. If the wife sold the investment 
portfolio for $100,000, she would owe tax only on her original $25,000 of untaxed 
90.     I.R.C. §§ 56(b)(1)(E), 151(d)(3) (2012).
91.     The transfer to higher-income spouse would result in incomplete use of tax credits if 
they phase out at higher income levels or there is another income-based imitation on credits.
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appreciation. Under current law, the husband recognizes no gain on the transfer, 
and the wife carries over their $50,000 basis.92 If she sells the investment, she owes 
tax on all $50,000 of gain. 
The investment portfolio is worth less to the wife under current law than 
under Davis, but how much less is often unknowable at the time of the divorce. The 
appropriate discount off the portfolio’s fair market value is the wife’s tax rate at the 
time of a sale of the asset multiplied by the tax gain that would have been taxed to 
her former husband, in this example $25,000. But this gain is not always taxed. If 
the wife owns the investment until she dies, any appreciation goes untaxed (at least 
under today’s tax code). Because of the tax uncertainty, spouses make choices with 
potentially significant tax implications with incomplete information, even if they 
make tax a top priority in their divorce.
Besides the often impossible knowledge required, this example highlights 
another, possibly more troubling aspect of tax shifting under today’s Code: Even 
when there is collective tax reduction or tax deferral because of tax shifting, nothing 
in the law requires that the higher-income spouse compensate the lower-income 
spouse for that spouse’s increased tax burden. Tax shifting, if effective at tax 
reduction, reduces the taxes of the wealthier spouse and increases the taxes of the 
lower-income spouse. If spouses recognize this tax result, they may include in their 
negotiations offsetting payments from the wealthier spouse to the lower-income 
spouse. Some assume the “current-law bias…encourages the payer to make larger 
payments than he or she would otherwise make and that leaves the payee with more 
after-tax cash than he or she would otherwise have . . . .”93 However, to the extent 
the lower-income spouse is in the weaker negotiating position, possibly with less 
awareness of taxes, the tax shifting might be captured by the higher-income spouse. 
Studies show that wives are in weak negotiating positions,94 and therefore 
are likely to bear the brunt of the tax increase. Despite divorce leaving spouses, 
particularly wives, vulnerable,95 these women see their taxes increase without a 
structural means of demanding a share of the tax reduction. Therefore, it is incorrect 
to think of the existing tax benefit as helping women. It helps the collective, which 
may, in turn, help a strong negotiator.
92.     I.R.C. § 1041 (2012).
93.     Geier, supra note 33, at 435. 
94.     See Catherine T. Kenney, The Power of the Purse: Allocative Systems and Inequality in 
Couple Households, 20 gender & soc’Y 354 (2006); Amy Kroska, Examining Husband-Wife 
Differences in the Meaning of Family Financial Support, 51 soc. PersP. 63 (2008); Allen M. 
Parkman, Bargaining Over Housework: The Frustrating Situation of Secondary Wage Earn-
ers, 63 am. J. econ. & soc’Y 765 (2008).
95.     According to the Census Bureau, in 2009, 22% of women who had divorced in the 
previous twelve months were in poverty. Some 27% of recently divorced women had less 
than $25,000 in annual household income; and 23% of women who divorced in the past 
twelve months were more likely to receive public assistance (15% of recently divorced men). 
tImotHY grall, census Bureau, custodIal motHers and FatHers and tHeIr cHIld suPPort: 
2009, at 1 (2011).
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This tax planning imposes economic risk on the lower-income spouse 
in a divorce for pennies on the dollar in tax savings. Because the benefit of tax 
shifting is the difference between the spouses’ tax rates, the total amount that can be 
saved is limited. Thus, tax shifting for divorcing spouses, with its weak theoretical 
justification, poses significant concerns for recipient spouses and custodial parents 
as well as the income tax itself. Even if one hopes that it would aid couples 
transition to being single, tax shifting is a poor mechanism to accomplish that goal. 
As discussed in Part IV, there are other means to address congressional concerns 
that raise fewer of the problems created by tax shifting.
B. Explicit and Implicit Elections
Some, but not all, of the tax provisions that affect divorcing couples contain 
an election that allows spouses to choose which spouse is taxed on transferred 
income or receives the tax benefit provided by a child-based benefit. Some, but not 
all, of the elections are explicitly provided in the statute with a default in the event 
a couple does not make an election. Other elections are not explicitly provided in 
the tax code but are no less available. Instead, these implicit elections involve the 
structuring of payments between spouses to adopt or avoid a given classification. 
With explicit and implicit elections, couples can choose their preferred tax treatments 
as long as they properly structure their divorce or post-divorce transactions, and as 
long as they are willing to accept the non-tax ramifications of those choices. 
Just because these tax elections exist does not mean that everyone should 
or will consider taxation sufficiently important to trump other considerations. 
Considerations other than taxation may limit divorcing couples’ choices.96 For 
example, a spouse might be concerned that maintenance orders (also known as 
alimony or support payments) may be adjusted under state family law but property 
settlements are unlikely to be afforded the same flexibility. The fact that spouses 
have to choose which to sacrifice—a preferred tax result or a preferred family law 
result—is troubling but intentional.
One argument given for these explicit and implicit elections is that, “[b]ecause 
little revenue is at stake, the parties should be given full power to decide who, between 
96.     Other scholars have proposed maximizing choice or expanding tax benefits to encour-
age payments between divorced spouses. See Roland L. Hjorth, Divorce, Taxes, and the 1984 
Tax Reform Act: An Inadequate Response to an Old Problem, 61 WasH. l. rev. 151, 187 
(1986); Laurie L. Malman, Unfinished Reform: The Tax Consequences of Divorce, 61 N.Y.U. 
L. rev. 363, 367 (1986); Wendy Gerzog Shaller, On Public Policy Grounds, a Limited Tax 
Credit for Child Support and Alimony, 11 am. J. tax Pol’Y 321, 337 (1994) (proposing credit 
for payer); Laura Bigler, Note, A Change is Needed: The Taxation of Alimony and Child Sup-
port, 48 clev. st. l. rev. 361, 363 (2000) (proposing to tax alimony and child support to 
recipient).
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them, should be taxed.”97 The idea of choice is appealing, but, as discussed in Part 
II, the congressional purpose was not individual autonomy, it was tax reduction. 
Favoring choice is also more reasonable when the choice can be meaningfully 
made by divorcing couples and with little cost, neither of which is the case with 
divorce-related elections. 
But first, valuing choice for its own sake assumes there is little value in the 
government creating a tax system based on the most accurate definition of taxpayers’ 
ability to pay taxes. Determining who should pay taxes based on a theoretically 
sound standard contributes to a sense of fairness and equity in the system. By 
creating elections, Congress confirms that there is no right answer as to who should 
owe the tax and, possibly, that no person should owe tax.98 For example, if alimony 
should be taxed to the person who controls the income, the election to tax the payer 
has no theoretical foundation; if alimony should be taxed to the person who earns 
it, there is no justification for taxing the recipient.99 If neither person is theoretically 
required to pay the tax, then maybe no one should owe the tax. 
For those couples that benefit by maximizing their elections, factors other 
than a couple’s worthiness for tax reduction determine their tax benefit. Not based 
on their ability to pay taxes or on another equitable theory, their reduction is based 
on their, and their lawyers’, negotiating abilities and the spouses’ relative taxable 
incomes. Thus, the elections allow well-advised and well-situated couples to 
reduce their taxes in violation of general norms of equity that demand that similarly 
situated taxpayers be taxed similarly and that those with greater ability to pay taxes 
pay more in tax.100 
97.     Geier, supra note 33, at 432. The ABA advocated “private ordering,” or for taxpayers to 
have the choice as to who would pay the tax. See also aBa domestIc relatIons tax sImPlIFI-
catIon task Force, PrelImInarY sPecIFIcatIons For sImPlIFIcatIon oF domestIc relatIons tax 
laW 1, 3–4 (1982) (advocating for “private ordering” or for taxpayers to have the choice as to 
who would pay the tax and failing to mention that the tax burden would generally be imposed 
on the lower-income recipient spouse).
98.     For a discussion of why elections are problematic, see Emily Cauble, Tax Elections: 
How to Live With Them if We Can’t Live Without Them, 53 santa clara l. rev. 421, 445–48 
(2013); Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections as an Element of Design in the 
Federal Tax System, 47 Harv. J. on legIs. 21, 22–25 (2010); Heather M. Field, Tax Elec-
tions & Private Bargaining, 31 va. tax rev. 1, 4–7 (2011) [hereinafter Field, Tax Elections]; 
George K. Yin, The Taxation of Private Business Enterprises: Some Policy Questions Stimu-
lated by the “Check-the-Box” Regulations, 51 smu l. rev. 125, 129–31 (1997); Edward 
Yorio, The Revocability of Federal Tax Elections, 44 FordHam l. rev. 463, 463–65 (1975).
99.     Because tax-shifting focuses on collective tax reduction, it disregards the fact that there 
might be a theoretically appropriate person to tax for alimony. See Cauble, supra note 98, at 
464–65, 472 n.234. The desire to create an optimal default for taxation of alimony payments 
also assumes that one spouse will not owe the tax. See, e.g., Field, Tax Elections, supra note 
98, at 64–65.
100.     James Repetti & Diane Ring, Horizontal Equity Revisited, 13 Fla. tax rev. 135, 
135–36 (2012).
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If the only goal of elections in the divorce context is tax reduction, the 
elections allow revenue to leak from the revenue system without a sound basis for 
the leakage. Leakage of any sort from a theoretically pure tax system is tax avoidance 
or, if illegal, tax evasion.101 Therefore, these provisions provide congressionally 
supported tax avoidance. If divorced couples are encouraged to avoid taxes, should 
married couples and single individuals not do the same? In other words, if choosing 
tax reduction is good for one group, should it not be good for another?
Moreover, that this method of tax reduction may require wise use of elections 
increases the tax system’s complexity and means that receipt of this tax relief 
is often not automatic. Not only are there risks of higher costs and misallocated 
resources with increased complexity,102 but divorcing spouses must understand 
their choices and, possibly, work together to enjoy the intended tax benefit. Poorly 
advised spouses are unlikely to know about the elections or plan effectively. As 
many divorce litigants forgo lawyers, and pro se clients, in turn, tend to get less tax 
advice, unrepresented couples may be unaware of these tax consequences of their 
divorce.103 And not all attorneys advise regarding the tax consequences of divorce.104 
One lawyer testified before Congress that, after hiring a divorce attorney, “it is not 
usual for a divorcing individual to think they need a tax lawyer.”105 
Even for those divorcing spouses with knowledge of taxation, these elections 
may not be salient.106 Taxes may have little salience when a couple is faced with 
the other hardships incurred in a divorce, as divorce is one of the more stressful 
events a person can face.107 In the midst of the trauma of divorce, the impact of the 
101.     Although we might want couples to equalize their earnings, it is unclear why they 
should be given a tax benefit to encourage that objective.
102.     See Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-Box 
Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HoFstra l. rev. 405, 410–11 (2005). 
103.     McMullen & Oswald, supra note 54, at 63 (citing aBa standIng comm. on tHe de-
lIverY oF legal svrvs., resPondIng to tHe needs oF tHe selF-rePresented dIvorce lItIgant 
11–12 (1994)).
104.     See infra notes 110, 230–31 and accompanying text (addressing counsel’s potentially 
incomplete knowledge of both tax and divorce law). 
105.     Hearing on H.R. 3475, supra note 18, at 272 (comments by Marjorie A. O’Connell, 
Esq., O’Connell & Associates).
106.     For more on salience in taxation, see Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WasH. u. l. rev. 
59, 63 (2009); David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market 
Salience and Political Salience, 65 tax l. rev. 19, 19–20 (2011); Edward J. McCaffery & 
Jonathan Baron, Isolation Effects and the Neglect of Indirect Effects of Fiscal Policies, 19 J. 
BeHav. decIsIon makIng 289, 289 (2006); Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias 
in Designing Taxes, 28 Yale J. on reg. 253, 255 (2011); Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory 
Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 13330, 2007).
107.     See Paul R. Amato, The Consequences of Divorce for Adults and Children, 62 J. 
MarrIage & Fam. 1269, 1273 (2000); Matthijs Kalmijn & Christiaan W.S. Monden, Are the 
Negative Effects of Divorce on Well-Being Dependent Upon Marital Quality, 68 J. marrIage 
& Fam. 1197, 1197–99 (2006).
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couple’s choices on their individual taxes may not be intuitive. With the explicit 
elections, there is nothing on the tax return that alerts spouses to their right to opt 
out of defaults.108 Additionally, there is nothing on the tax return about implicit 
elections because they depend upon how couples structure their obligations. The 
fact that some elections are explicit in the statute might, nonetheless, reinforce the 
expectation that divorcing spouses are aware of, and understand, their choices. 
Thus, spouses’ knowledge of, and ability to optimally use, the explicit and 
implicit elections varies. As a result, divorce taxation “continues to generate an 
overabundance of confusion and litigation . . . an unfortunate and unnecessary 
cost to both the government and divorcing couples.”109 Some couples likely do 
not optimize their tax reduction due to lack of awareness of the rules because 
some taxpayers, and, more egregiously, their advisors, do not know the tax 
consequences of their choices.110 On the other hand, many others understand them 
well enough to litigate in the hope of favorable outcomes.111 Some couples even 
plan ahead and request rulings or tax opinions about the tax consequences of their 
divorce settlements.112 
In the face of an information deficit by some, but not all, divorcing couples, 
the flexibility Congress and the ABA value may only add to the difficulty of divorce 
and may not produce optimal tax results for many couples. Many people do not 
respond well to having many choices.113 If divorcing spouses fail to make wise use 
of their choices, the current system presents a risk of giving a windfall to payers 
(and the well-advised) and a burden to recipients (and the vulnerable).
 
108.     To increase salience, Congress could require a closing of the books tax return for 
spouses, as required for short-year businesses after terminations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-
2(a)(2) (2010).
109.     Geier, supra note 33, at 409.
110.     See, e.g., Pettet v. U.S., No. 7:96-CV-55-F3, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19127, at *18 
(E.D.N.C. Nov. 4, 1997) (recounting that the taxpayer, attorney, and accountant testified they 
were not familiar with the tax requirements of alimony).
111.     See generally Melvin v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1425 (2008), aff’d, 303 Fed. 
Appx. 791 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that the petitioner was not entitled to the claimed deduc-
tion for alimony); Burkes v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1772 (1998) (holding that petitioner 
was not negligent for reasonably relying on her attorney). 
112.     For examples of couples requesting rulings and tax opinions in advance of their di-
vorce, see Cunningham v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 801, 801 (1994); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
126246-11, at 2 (Feb. 10, 2012); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 135343-09, at 1 (June 18, 2010); I.R.S. 
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 133864-09, at 1 (Apr 23, 2010).
113.     See PresIdent’s advIsorY Panel on Fed. tax reForm, sImPle, FaIr, and Pro-groWtH 
91 (2005) (arguing taxpayers are paralyzed by savings choices). See generally BarrY 
scHWartz, tHe Paradox oF cHoIce: WHY more Is less (2004) (arguing too much choice can 
be paralyzing). 
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And even within this rubric, not all spouses have a choice about the 
allocation of their tax burdens.114 For example, children’s personal exemptions 
are often considered a family asset.115 Family courts use the elective nature of the 
exemption to transform it into tradable property. Not all states do so, but thirty-
five states’ courts routinely exercise their power to allocate exemptions, directing 
the custodial parent to execute the necessary written declarations to transfer 
children’s exemptions.116 One could argue that greater marital assets may smooth 
the way for other aspects of divorce planning. However, this use of the exemption 
fundamentally changes what it is by severing the exemption from the child whose 
existence justifies the deduction.
Whether or not judges compel certain choices, to plan properly, spouses 
must accurately anticipate both their relative earnings for the period in which the 
tax shifting will take place, and changes in the tax law that may be independent 
of divorce taxation. Depending on the mood of Congress, the future of people’s 
earnings may be more predictable than the future of the tax law. 
Changes in law are unpredictable in part because Congress may not even 
consider important tax changes’ impact upon divorce agreements. For example, the 
phasing out of benefits may negate tax shifting’s savings, but it is unlikely divorced 
couples’ concerns will be raised in congressional debates on the topic. While the 
phaseout of personal exemptions for high-income taxpayers was first applied in 
1988,117 the phaseout was itself phased out beginning in 2006,118 eliminated entirely 
in 2010, and the phaseout of the phaseout was repealed beginning after 2012, all 
114.     California uses computer software, DissoMaster, to calculate tax-minimizing alloca-
tions. This black box approach obscures allocations, further divorcing them from any broader 
goals than tax reduction, while still not responding to potential changes in circumstance or the 
tax law. See Calculate Child Support, cal. dePt. cHIld suPPort servs., http://www.childsup.
ca.gov/Resources/CalculateChildSupport.aspx (May 2, 2015).
115.     The National Taxpayer Advocate argues exemptions should only be allocated volun-
tarily. nat’l taxPaYer advocate,, FY 2001 annual rePort to congress 109 (Dec. 31, 2001), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2001_tas.pdf. Under regulations, if a noncustodial parent is 
entitled to an exemption under a divorce agreement and the custodial parent refuses to assign 
the exemption, the noncustodial parent can sue in state court over the divorce decree. See, 
e.g., Bojarski v. Bojarski, 41 A.3d 544 (Me. 2012); Spencer v. Spencer, No. 30320, 2011 WL 
4537845 (Haw. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2011).
116.     nat’l taxPaYer advocate, supra note 115, at 110–17.
117.     Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 103, 100 Stat. 2085.
118.     Section 151(d)(3)(F) provided that the phaseout provision expired on December 31, 
2009. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–16, § 
102, 115 Stat. 38. This amendment was scheduled to sunset at the end of 2010. Id. at § 901. 
However, Section 101 of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job 
Creation Act of 2010 extended this sunset until the end of 2012. Tax Relief, Unemployment 
Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 101, 124 
Stat. 3298. 
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without comment on the effect on divorced couples.119 If a divorce decree is finalized 
in a year when a phaseout is not in effect, its tax plan is unlikely to be optimal for 
wealthy primary-earner couples under the phaseout. Similarly, if a divorce decree 
is finalized when there is a phaseout, the plan is likely not optimal if the phaseout 
lapses. In the event that spouses do not accurately anticipate changes in the law, the 
couple may suffer higher taxes. 
And though knowledge may bring power, flexibility risks generating 
taxpayer frustration when taxpayers and their lawyers structure transfers to achieve 
particular tax results, but without a willingness to bear all of the burdens of that 
structure. For example, for payments to be taxable as alimony, the payments 
must terminate at the recipient’s death. The implicit election to make a property 
settlement qualify as alimony requires inclusion of this feature. Thus, the election 
requires the recipient bear the risk that, if the recipient dies, her estate will not 
receive the payment. If a couple fails to accept this limitation, as in Rosenthal v. 
Commissioner,120 it is insufficient for them to claim the payments are “reportable by 
Wife and deductible by Husband” as their agreement provided. Incomplete private 
ordering may be the worst of all worlds for couples. 
There are other costs associated with the elections that divorcing couples 
might not recognize. For instance, to elect out of the default property settlement 
rules (by selling the property and distributing cash) imposes current taxation on the 
payer. Similarly, if a couple explicitly elects out of alimony, the payer must pay the 
tax on transfer payments. On the other hand, if there is an implicit election out of 
alimony tax treatment, it might be because the couple structures the payments as 
child support (in which case the payer is taxed) or as property settlements (in which 
case the tax may be deferred). For many, the costs imposed by the choices, required 
by the many tradeoffs divorce demands, may be difficult to keep straight.
One cost that is often recognized with divorce-related taxation is 
administrative cost. The taxpayer’s costs have been discussed above, but no less 
troubling are those imposed on the government. For example, in 2010, 47% of 
returns with alimony deductions did not match a recipient’s return reporting the 
income.121 The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration analyzed 567,887 
returns for 2010 and found a “discrepancy of more than $2.3 billion in deductions 
claimed without corresponding income reported.”122 Because of various limitations 
imposed by the IRS, only 10,870 of the 266,190 that were identified as having a 
discrepancy were examined further.123 
119.     From a review of congressional reports. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. 
L. No. 112-240, § 101(b)(2), 126 Stat. 2316. 
120.     70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1614, 1615 (1995).
121.     treasurY InsPector gen. For tax admIn., deP’t oF tHe treasurY, sIgnIFIcant dIs-
crePancIes exIst BetWeen alImonY deductIons claImed BY PaYers and Income rePorted BY 
recIPIents 4 (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2014reports/2014400
22fr.pdf.
122.     Id. 
123.     Id. at 5.
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Addressing the discrepancy over alimony is among the easier administrative 
tasks for the IRS with respect to divorce-related taxation. The transfer of child-
based benefits poses greater problems. Despite the requirement that noncustodial 
parents must attach a waiver to claim exemptions, the IRS has difficulty enforcing 
this requirement, at least initially. Only on audit are the benefits disallowed.124 
Audit is triggered if two people claim the same child because of the duplication 
of the child’s Social Security number. Nonetheless, the first parent to file is likely 
to receive the benefits, and any ensuing tax refund, until the audit is complete, 
and possibly forever if the spouse who incorrectly receives a refund is judgment-
proof.125 The second parent to claim the child, even if lawfully entitled to do so, is 
denied proper deductions and credits until the audit is complete.
Perhaps more troubling from the administrative perspective is sorting out 
payments when no one is willing to pay the tax. Much of the litigation over these 
payments is the result of neither spouse reporting income and, therefore, neither 
spouse paying the taxes due.126 Each claims that either an explicit or implicit 
election was made that shields the spouse from the tax obligation.127 It is impossible 
to know whether the spouses plan the tax evasion together, or if instead, a single 
spouse simply takes the opportunity not to report the income. The results are clear, 
however. The IRS continues to confront numerous cases regarding who should owe 
tax on transfers incident to divorce.128 
Because only some divorcing couples are in a position to effectively use 
these elections and they often give rise to tax abuse, the flexibility needs to be 
removed for all. Instead of creating a system in which well-advised taxpayers 
can reduce their collective taxes, and in the process hopefully share the savings 
in an equitable way, Congress should dole out its largess in a way that is more 
intentionally equitable. Flexibility for its own sake is not a virtue in taxation, and 
elections are not without costs. Part IV below proposes a simple tax system that 
provides for divorcing couples.
124.     Nassau, supra note 68, at 112.
125.     Id. at 112 n.138.
126.     See supra note 26 and accompanying text; Schutter v. Comm’r, 242 F.3d 390 (10th 
Cir. 2000); Richardson v. Comm’r, 125 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 1997); Hoover v. Comm’r, 102 F.3d 
842 (6th Cir. 1996); Sa’d v. Comm’r, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 784 (2012); Murphy v. Comm’r, 71 
T.C.M. (CCH) 3144 (1996).
127.     Congress is aware of this problem. Hearing on H.R. 3475, supra note 18, at 264 
(statement of Marjorie O’Connell, Esq., O’Connell & Associates).
128.     The government often sends inconsistent notices to each spouse to protect federal 
revenue because one taxpayer will win in court, but this approach risks political backlash. 
Richardson, 125 F.3d at 553; Murphy, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) at 3144. When the IRS settled for tax 
on half of the alimony with the wife, a court held that settled the appropriate tax treatment for 
the husband. Christoph v. United States, 919 F. Supp. 1576 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
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C. Family Classifications 
Through the enactment of divorce-related tax provisions, Congress 
determined that terminating a marriage is a sufficiently unique occurrence that 
it deserves special tax treatment. Although ceasing to be a partner or shareholder 
receives special provision in the Code,129 the termination of most relationships is not 
subject to special rules. What is troubling with respect to divorce is that partner and 
shareholder statuses are available to everyone; general availability is not the case 
with divorce. Only couples (and in thirteen states only heterosexual couples) who 
otherwise meet their state’s requirements and choose to marry can divorce. The 
system treats these relationships differently, and for some couples, favorably. This 
differentiation, whether or not economically beneficial to the couples, is problematic.
Special treatment in the tax system provides the government’s support for 
marriage by easing the burden on couples who leave marriage. As of the 2010 census, 
58% of men and 55.2% of women over the age eighteen were married; however, only 
48.4% lived in a husband-wife household.130 This is an increase from the 2000 census 
for marital status, in which the percentage of those over fifteen was about 54.4%; 
however, the number of married couples living together has decreased from 51.7%.131 
Thus, the valued relationship, the one once seen as the normal relationship, is far from 
universal, and it is arguably less normal than it used to be.
For those who are married, there are theoretical problems with extending tax 
advantages to the termination of the relationship. Subject to some debate beyond 
the scope of this Article, the argument can be made (as I have made elsewhere) 
that joint taxation measures a married couple’s ability to pay taxes in a way it 
does not for most roommates, siblings, or friends.132 Additionally, taxing spouses 
as two separate individuals imposes a difficult tracking burden between them. 
129.     I.R.C. §§ 331, 736 (2012).
130.     daPHne loFquIst, terrY lugaIla, martIn o’connell & saraH FelIz, u.s. census 
Bureau, 2010 census BrIeFs: HouseHolds and FamIlIes 5 (2012), http://www.census.gov/
prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf; u.s. census Bureau, statIstIcal aBstract oF tHe 
unIted states: 2012, at 53, tbl.57 (129th ed. 2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/
statab/2012/tables/12s0057.pdf.
131.     loFquIst et al., supra note 130.
132.     Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Have and to Hold: What Does Love (of Money) Have 
to Do with Federal Tax Filing?, 11 nev. L.J. 718 (2011). But see Grace Blumberg, Sexism 
in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 
BuFF. l. rev. 49 (1972); Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and 
Addressing the Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & Pol. 241, 242 (1997); Pamela B. 
Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 tex. l. 
rev. 1, 4 (1980); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Shar-
ing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HastIngs L.J. 63, 64 (1993); Shari Motro, A New 
“I Do”: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IoWa l. rev. 1509, 1512 (2006); Bea 
Ann Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 tex. l. rev. 
689, 692 (1990); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. cal. l. rev. 339, 
339–40 (1994).
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The information necessary to know who should be taxed on income may not be 
kept but for tax purposes. These justifications for the special treatment of married 
couples no longer apply once the marriage has been terminated. 
Although one could argue that after divorce former spouses still share 
resources, the similarity between married and divorced couples ends there.133 With 
the divorce decree, sharing and comingling of funds beyond any legal requirement 
presumably ends. Increases in one’s wealth generally do not improve the other’s 
standard of living, and it often requires legal intervention for declines in one’s 
income to reduce payments.134 Information regarding this legally mandated 
sharing is also available in divorce documents, significantly reducing much of the 
administrative concern of tracing finances within marriage. Therefore, one person’s 
wealth may support more than one person, but after divorce, it is less persuasive to 
argue that two people function as an economic unit or that administrative problems 
prevent the tracking of transfers.
Nonetheless, making divorce trigger tax recognition is an imperfect measure 
for the end of economic unity or administrative complexity. However, the federal 
tax system’s use of a bright-line rule for state-defined marriage makes divorce-
related provisions more administrable, and limits the revenue lost to the federal 
government through the tax planning of other couples. Using marriage and divorce 
as a proxy, the government does not have to determine who acted like they were 
married; it must only consider whether they were once legally married, and that 
they no longer are. Moreover, the rule is generally easy to understand because the 
status of marriage is a broad one that exists outside of tax. Confusion does exist at 
the margins as to when couples are legally married, and therefore when they can 
divorce.135 Additionally, not all of those who marry are currently able to divorce, 
as some states do not allow those legally married under foreign law to use their 
domestic divorce proceedings.136 
Relationships whose terminations do not receive special tax assistance are 
marginalized by existing tax law that favors marriage. One scholar argues that the 
joint return begins with a certain family arrangement as the “only relevant type 
of family.”137 That same definition carries through when the Code recognizes the 
133.     Marital status is an indicator of increased economic position, at least for educated 
spouses. FrY & coHn, supra note 89, at 3. 
134.     See JoHn deWItt gregorY, Peter nasH sWIsHer & roBIn FretWell WIlson, under-
standIng FamIlY laW 374–85, 402–08 (4th ed. 2013).
135.     See id. at 36–61; WadlIngton & o’BrIen, supra note 5, at 24–31.
136.     Tracy A. Thomas, Same-Sex Divorce, 5 cal. l. rev. cIrcuIt 218 (2014); Judge: Mar-
ried Women Can’t Divorce in Alabama, assocIated Press neWsWIre, Mar. 12, 2014, avail-
able at Factiva, Doc. No. APRS000020140312ea3c002y5; David Crary & Holbrook Mohn, 
Divorce is the Latest Gay Rights Battle Facing Same-Sex Partners, HuFFIngton Post (Dec. 
1, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/02/in-some-states-gays-fight_n_4372851.
html.
137  Anthony C. Infanti, Decentralizing Family, 2010 utaH l. rev. 605, 606–07 (2010).
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termination of only that type of relationship. This division between couples is not based 
on equitable principles of taxation, but by marital status under state family law. This 
benefit is limited despite concerns raised for unmarried couples, siblings, roommates, 
same-sex relationships in states that do not allow same-sex marriage, and more. 
The group of taxpayers who are not married is significant. In 2010, single-
person households composed 26.7% of the population, family households headed 
by a woman with no husband present were 13.1%, and family households headed 
by a man with no wife present were 5.0%. Unmarried-couple households were 
6.6% of the population and all other multi-person households were 6.8%.138 The 
existence of many different types of relationships, each of which might involve 
the transfer of property or support, should make us question the validity of tax 
reduction for some individuals in one particular type of relationship. 
In particular, there are many types of romantic relationships whose 
termination is not governed by divorce-related taxation. For example, although 
thirty-seven states (plus the District of Columbia)139 currently recognize same-sex 
marriage, in the other thirteen states couples are unable to use the state family law 
regime to referee the termination of their relationships. And eight states140 have 
civil unions or domestic partnerships granting privileges similar to marriage. It is 
uncertain how these couples should be taxed. Couples married under common law 
principles must file as married,141 but must couples who enter into civil partnerships? 
Should it matter if a civil partnership is the only legal relationship granted to same-
sex couples in the state? Do opposite-sex couples who enter into civil partnerships 
receive the same tax treatment as same-sex couples? Should the termination of 
these other relationships be governed by divorce-related tax rules?
The complications these terminations have in non-tax respects carry over 
into their tax treatment. There is currently little statutory provision for post-
termination obligations between same-sex couples in states that do not recognize 
same-sex marriage, both with respect to the obligations themselves, and to the tax 
treatment thereof.142 The common law of many states requires that among unmarried 
couples, whether or not the parties are of the same-sex, a wealthier member provide 
palimony to the other following the termination of their relationship if the potential 
recipient can meet a high burden of proof regarding the nature of the relationship. 
Palimony is an extension of alimony and property division among couples who were 
not legally married, but who entered into a similar type of contract. Consequently, 
138.     loFquIst et al., supra note 130, at 6.
139.     Where State Laws Stand, Freedom to marrY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/
where-state-laws-stand (Feb. 11, 2015). This area of law remains in a state of flux. In 2015, 
the Supreme Court will review the freedom to marry in cases arising in Kentucky, Michigan, 
Ohio, and Tennessee. Id.
140.     Id. (California, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, and 
Washington).
141.     Rev. Proc. 2013-17, 2013-11 I.R.B. 2.
142.     See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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lawyers can argue that their clients have rights to accumulated wealth regardless 
of who holds legal title to that wealth; however, this lawsuit requires proof of a 
private contract that the relationship would be treated with the same legal status as 
marriage.143 California first recognized the equitable rights of long-term cohabitants 
in Marvin v. Marvin144 in 1976, and most states have followed suit.  If unmarried 
cohabitants do not prove the contract elements of the lawsuit, most states do not 
allow them to avail themselves of state family divorce law.145 
For those terminations that warrant palimony, even though substantively 
similar to alimony and property settlements, the payments are not taxed pursuant 
to the divorce rules. There are three possible tax treatments for palimony, but the 
question of which treatment applies is not well-settled. First, transfers or payments 
could be characterized as gifts. In this case, the payer must pay tax when earning 
the income used to provide the gift, and is also subject to the gift tax; however, gifts 
are excluded from the recipient’s income.146 Because of the favored tax treatment of 
recipients, what constitutes a gift for tax purposes has been the subject of litigation. 
In Commissioner v. Duberstein, the Supreme Court largely defined gift by reference 
to the payer’s motives.147 The Court requires payers give the gift with “detached and 
disinterested generosity” in order for the transfer to be excluded from the recipient’s 
income. A payment proceeds from “a detached and disinterested generosity” if it is 
made “out of affection, respect . . . or like impulses,” only then it is an excludible 
gift.148 Payments for services rendered, or if there is a moral or legal duty motivating 
the payment, are not gifts and are not, therefore, excludible from income. Thus, 
the determination that these payments are gifts is more likely if there is no legal 
obligation to provide them.149 
143.     Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 santa clara l. rev. 805, 830–31 (2008); 
Wendy C. Gerzog, Shapiro: Palimony and the Estate Tax, 131 tax notes 859 (2011).
144.     557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976).
145.     gregorY et al., supra note 134, at 26–27; WadlIngton & o’BrIen, supra note 5, at 
48–49.
146.     I.R.C. §102 (2012). For a discussion of the taxation of gifts, see Joseph M. Dodge, 
Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform, 91 Harv. l. rev. 1177 (1978); Douglas A. Kahn & Jef-
frey H. Kahn, “Gifts, Gafts, and Gefts”—The Income Tax Definition and Treatment of Private 
and Charitable ‘Gifts’ and a Principled Policy Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from 
Income, 78 notre dame l. rev. 441 (2003); William A. Klein, An Enigma in the Federal 
Income Tax: The Meaning of the World ‘Gift’, 48 mInn. l. rev. 215 (1963); Marjorie E. Ko-
rnhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 24 conn. 
l. rev. 1, 28–37 (1992).
147.     363 U.S. 278 (1960).
148.     Id. at 285. 
149.     Courts often, but not always, find transfers between unmarried cohabitants were a 
gift and subject to the gift tax. See, e.g., Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945); Comm’r v. 
Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1991); Reis 
v. Comm’r, 33 T.C. (CCH) 1333 (1974); Pascarelli v. Comm’r, 55 T.C. 1082 (1971). But see, 
e.g., Green v. Comm’r, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 764 (1987) (holding that where a woman sued for 
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Second, an extra-statutory notion of non-taxable support could allow the 
recipient of palimony to exclude any income received on the termination of the 
relationship.150 Despite the lack of statutory basis, support receives special tax 
treatment in other contexts.151 Similar to the treatment as a gift, support would 
require only a single layer of taxation; however, while the payer would owe tax 
when earning the income used to provide the support, the payer would not be 
subject to the gift tax. Although favorable, this position of excludible support is a 
risky one to take. The existing exclusion for support for tax purposes is narrow and, 
without congressional sanction, is unlikely to be expanded. 
The exclusion for support is limited for numerous reasons: the costs it 
imposes on the government, the opportunity it provides for tax gamesmanship, the 
fact that the greatest benefit of exclusion goes to higher-income individuals, and the 
difficulty of deciding how much of any payment constitutes support.152 One form of 
excluded support is child support, and it is excluded without a special code provision 
mandating its exclusion.153 Additionally, the IRS has accepted that government 
support is excluded from the recipient’s income, although Congress reacted to the 
exclusion by requiring the inclusion of some government benefits.154 Enlarging the 
support exclusion to include palimony is to risk the problems of exclusion, not only 
for palimony itself, but for any newly-created support obligations. To the extent 
that society imposes new obligations on taxpayers for support, such as the enforced
compensation, receipt of money was compensation). The courts’ focus is on state law. For 
example, when one member of an unmarried couple died, the estate argued homemaking ser-
vices were insufficient to support a cohabitation contract. Estate of Shapiro v. United States, 
634 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit overturned based on its reading of Nevada 
contract law (rather than tax theory), which permitted the provision of an estate in return for 
homemaking services. Id.
150.     See Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 Fla. tax rev. 295, 
299 (2011); Patricia A. Cain, Federal Tax Consequences of Civil Unions, 30 caP. u. l. rev. 
387, 402–03 (2002) (assuming support should be excluded from income).
151.     Audubond v. Shufedt, 181 U.S. 575 (1901) (stating that in bankruptcy alimony is 
awarded special treatment and not treated as a debt because it is a general obligation of sup-
port).
152.     One risk of expanded support is drawing a line around what is excludible support and 
what, if any, must be included in income. Rules for defining child support would not necessar-
ily carry over to the adult context.
153.     See supra Part I.B.
154.     I.R.C. § 86 (2012); I.R.S. Notice 11-14, 2011-11 I.R.B. 544 (excluding certain home-
owner aid from income); I.T. 3194, 1938-1 C.B. 114 (1938) (excluding social security from 
income). See Robert W. Wood & Richard C. Morris, The General Welfare Exception to Gross 
Income, 109 tax notes 203 (2005). 
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support of elderly parents by their children,155 similar arguments can be made as 
those concerning palimony. Instead of this expansion, we should recognize these 
legally mandated payments as a source of income for the recipient. 
Third, palimony could be taxed to both payer and recipient. Although 
the most legally appropriate option, this characterization is politically unlikely 
because of the discrepancy in treatment compared to current divorce taxation. 
A cornerstone of the federal income tax is that increases in wealth, clearly 
realized by the taxpayer, and over which the taxpayer has control, is income 
subject to tax unless a specific provision exempts the taxpayer from taxation.156 
In Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, the Supreme Court held that punitive treble 
damages awarded under antitrust laws were income to the recipient.157 “The mere 
fact that the payments were extracted from the wrongdoers as punishment for 
unlawful conduct cannot detract from their character as taxable income to the 
recipients.”158 Unless Congress acts, there are “no limitations as to the source of 
taxable receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their nature.”159 
The broad rule of inclusion into income created by Glenshaw Glass applies 
even if the income is used to pay a debt. Except in limited circumstances, when 
a taxpayer earns income to pay a debt, the taxpayer is taxed on the earnings, and 
if a taxpayer uses appreciated property to settle a debt, the taxpayer is taxed on 
the appreciation.160 Receipt of the payment is also an increase in wealth for the 
recipient, so the receipt is also subject to tax.161 
If the Glenshaw Glass theory is adopted, the gain on appreciated 
property transferred between former partners would be taxable to the payer, just 
as a realization of the gain and receipt of the property would be taxable to the 
recipient as increased wealth. Similarly, payments of newly earned income for 
ongoing support would be taxable to both payer and recipient. The payer owes 
taxes on earning the income and does not receive a deduction for the payment 
of a personal obligation; the recipient owes taxes when receiving payment of an 
155.     Although rarely enforced, twenty states have laws that require adult children to 
provide financial support for their parents if their parents cannot afford to take care of them-
selves. Francine Russo, Caring for Aging Parents, tIme (July 22, 2013), http://healthland.
time.com/2013/07/22/caring-for-aging-parents-should-there-be-a-law; see also Shannon 
Frank Edelstone, Filial Responsibility: Can the Legal Duty to Support Our Parents Be Ef-
fectively Enforced?, 36 Fam. L.Q. 501 (2002). These filial responsibility laws are generally 
limited to necessities, so the recipient would presumably be in a low tax bracket.
156.     Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
157.     For a discussion of Glenshaw Glass, see Joseph M. Dodge, The Story of Glenshaw 
Glass: Towards a Modern Concept of Gross Income, in tax storIes 15 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2d 
ed. 2009).
158.     348 U.S. at 431.
159.     Id. at 429–30.
160.     I.R.C. § 61 (2012).
161.     Id.
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obligation owed by the payer.162 
Thus, there are three ways that palimony could be taxed. Although the 
tax treatment of same-sex couples has received much attention,163 the proper tax 
treatment of them as unmarried couples has yet to be resolved. As a practical 
matter, transfers are likely to be viewed as gifts or support, if only for political 
necessity because of the comparison between palimony payments and those made 
upon divorce. However, this extension of tax relief is problematic. In the case 
of palimony, tax relief is extended to harmonize the termination of non-marital 
relationships with divorce, but without the statutory basis that divorce-related 
taxation is built upon. A potential slippery slope of tax reduction may inadvertently 
be created when an easier (and more equitable) result is to eliminate the divorce-
based means of reduction.
In addition to the relationships which either have not been formalized as 
marriage, or which replicate the marriage relationship outside of state law, other 
romantic relationships exist whose termination might warrant taxation similar to the 
termination of marriage. Polygamy is unique in that it is considered by its adherents, 
but not the law, as marriage.164 Congress first denied recognition to polygamous 
marriages in the territories in 1862.165 States have since adopted these prohibitive 
laws, although a federal judge decriminalized polygamy in Utah by declaring the 
state’s law unconstitutional.166 The termination of a polygamous marriage could, 
theoretically, be structured to fit under the divorce-related tax laws, but it would 
not be taxed as such unless family law recognized these marriages.167 Unless and 
until that recognition, there is no provision for the termination of these relationships 
under state family or federal tax law. Therefore, as with payments between former 
same-sex spouses that do not qualify as gifts or as support, both the payer and the 
162.     The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013), provides no guidance for how the Treasury Department must interpret these issues 
going forward.
163.     See Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal Revenue Code, 34 
U.s.F. l. rev. 465 (2000); Catherine Martin Christopher, Will Filing Status Be Portable? Tax 
Implications of Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 4 PItt. tax rev. 137 (2007); 
Anthony C. Infanti, LGBT Taxpayers: A Collision of “Others”, 13 geo. J. gender & L. 1 
(2012); William P. Kratzke, The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) is Bad Income Tax Policy, 
35 U. mem. l. rev. 399 (2005); James M. Plunkett, Rethinking Tax Priorities: Marriage 
Neutrality, Children, and Contemporary Families, 78 U. cIn. l. rev. 1409 (2010); Carlton 
Smith & Edward Stein, Dealing with DOMA: Federal Non-recognition Complicated States 
Income Taxation of Same-Sex Relationships, 24 colum. J. gender & L. 29 (2012); Thomas, 
supra note 136.
164.     See Samuel D. Brunson, Taxing Polygamy, 91 WasH. u. l. rev. 113 (2013); Lynne 
Marie Kohm, Why Marriage is Still the Best Default in Estate Planning Conflicts, 117 Penn 
st. l. rev. 1219 (2013).
165.     Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (1862).
166.     Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013).
167.     Brunson, supra note 164.
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recipient should be taxed on any payments associated with the termination of a 
polygamous relationship.
Similarly, the termination of sexual relationships that resulted in children 
may be as worthy of tax reduction as the termination of a marriage, even if the 
parents were not a long-term couple. Shari Motro proposes a requirement of 
“preglimony” to support mothers in these relationships.168 As yet not adopted by 
any state, preglimony is financial assistance by fathers to unmarried women who 
conceive in order to equalize fathers’ burdens with that of pregnant women.169 
Motro proposes a tax treatment for these payments from expectant fathers 
to mothers that encourages, but does not require, payments from those “already 
predisposed to contribute” to pregnant women.170 This is more like the traditional 
income shifting than the tax shifting of divorce because, although the payer is 
predisposed to make payments, the income might not otherwise be shifted. Because 
these payments would not be required, they would likely be taxed as gifts under 
current law, and so they would taxable to the payer but not included in the recipient’s 
income.171 In order to encourage these payments with a tax reduction, Motro would 
allow the payer to deduct the payments and the recipient to include them in income, 
as with alimony today. The problem with this tax reduction is the same problem 
as with tax shifting: It benefits only a small group of couples, and ignores that this 
savings to the “team” benefits the payer and not the recipient.172 The payer ends up 
with a lower tax bill, and the recipient with a higher one.173 
If preglimony develops in a way that its recipients use the legal system 
to impose and enforce support, required payments to the recipient would likely 
lose gift characterization because payments would fail the required “detached 
and disinterested generosity” test.174 And, if Motro successfully makes this an 
168.     Shari Motro, The Price of Pleasure, 104 nW. u. l. rev. 917 (2010). 
169.     Id. at 919. 
170.     Shari Motro, Preglimony, 63 stan. l. rev. 647, 673 (2011). Motro assumes this 
“sidesteps thorny enforcement issues and encourages cooperation rather than conflict.” Id. at 
672. However, this regime shifts enforcement to the IRS to determine whether payments were 
made, whether there was a pregnancy, and whether the recipient reported the income. Motro 
omits proof for paternity. Id. at 694. With alimony, Social Security numbers must be included 
to reduce fraud. It is unlikely that many in preglimony situations would want to share this 
sensitive information.
171.     Although I disagree with Motro’s argument for treating these payments like a gift 
when there is a legal obligation to make payments, I agree with her when the law does not 
require payments. See id. at 680–81.
172.     Id. at 673, 676. If you “hook” couples on income shifting, what is the political likeli-
hood that it will not be continued post-birth? 
173.     Motro recognizes that it may encourage “ungenerous” payments and proposes pay-
ments be deductible/includible only over a threshold, in accordance with some measure of 
their circumstances, or to require equal shifting. Id. at 693. This does not overcome the prob-
lem that the lower-income recipient has a higher tax burden. 
174.     Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960). 
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obligation owed to the women themselves,175 the payments should not be taxable 
as child support to only one parent. Therefore, unless there is a change in the tax 
law, as Motro proposes, these payments would likely be taxed to the payer when 
earned, and to the recipient when received. This tax treatment would not produce 
the intended benefits of tax shifting upon divorce.
The discrepancy between the tax treatment of the termination of marriage 
and the termination of other relationships highlights the problematic nature of 
existing tax reduction. Notwithstanding these problems, there is one potential benefit 
from the use of a bright-line test to determine whether couples can use the special 
divorce-related tax provisions. Groups that are not afforded the same recognition in 
the marriage-focused tax law have an obvious example of discrimination to attack: 
taxes.176 Moreover, in taxation, these groups have an opponent that many other 
Americans love to hate,177 which might, in turn, help these groups achieve other 
rights. As was the case in United States v. Windsor,178 which now provides equality 
under federal law, it may be possible to leverage benefits gained in the tax realm to 
other areas of life.
As long as divorce-related taxation stands as evidence of a favored 
relationship, it is evidence of favoritism in the Code. That the tax reduction is only 
available to those within the favored group who wisely use implicit or explicit 
elections to maximize tax shifting makes the situation no less problematic. The tax 
system helps define who is worthy of recognition and who is not. In that process, 
these provisions marginalize those not entitled to the benefits. For all of those who 
are excluded from special recognition by the tax system, their relationships are 
deemed of so little value that their termination is not worthy of aid.
III. ProPosal
This Part proposes an alternative to the existing favoritism found in divorce-
related taxation that minimizes the problematic features discussed in Part II. Today, 
divorce-related tax reduction is only available to those who make wise use of implicit 
and explicit elections (or were lucky), and benefit from tax shifting. Consistent with 
175.     Motro, supra note 170, at 693. In the surrogacy context, there is debate about whether 
payments should be taxed as child support or as compensation. See Bridget Crawford, Taxa-
tion, Pregnancy, and Privacy, 16 Wm. & marY J. Women & L. 327, 343–45 (2010).
176.     Patricia Cain and Anthony Infanti have both argued that the tax code can be used to 
argue that discrimination against same-sex couples is unconstitutional. Cain, supra note 150, 
at 406; Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Reform Discourse, 32 va. tax rev. 205 (2012).
177.     See Scott Clement, America’s Love/Hate (But Mostly Hate) Relationship with Taxes, 
in 7 Charts, WasH. Post (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/
wp/2014/04/15/americas-lovehate-but-mostly-hate-relationship-with-taxes-in-7-charts/.
178.     33 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). See also Evan Perez, U.S. Expands Legal Benefits, Services 
for Same-Sex Marriages, CNN (Feb. 10, 2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/08/politics/
holder-same-sex-marriage-rights/.
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this Symposium’s focus,179 I urge Congress to use any tax reduction that is granted 
upon divorce to decrease inequality. If aid is to be granted to divorcing spouses, it 
should be granted to those spouses who are in greater need as compared to other 
taxpayers, and not only because they are in a different tax position vis-à-vis their 
former spouse. In the process, this proposal revises the tax treatment of transfers 
upon divorce, narrows the opportunity for confusion and tax gamesmanship, and 
provides a tax credit to divorced spouses who are in greatest need.
With this proposal, some couples (generally wealthier ones) may find their 
collective taxes increased, even as the lower-income spouses’ taxes decrease. 
Accepting this proposal therefore requires an acceptance that divorce terminates 
the link between spouses that the tax system currently recognizes.180 Under existing 
law, marriage changes the general rule that realized gains are subject to tax: When 
spouses transfer property between themselves, the payer is not taxed on any 
appreciation in the property and the recipient is not taxed on the receipt.181 Similarly, 
joint filing (with its favorable tax brackets compared to married individuals filing 
separately) preempts the shifting of other taxable income by giving spouses an 
economic incentive to file as a unit.182 Thus, as a married couple, spouses are 
generally considered one unit and not two individuals. This benefit does not exist 
for unmarried taxpayers; unmarried individuals are almost always considered 
separately for tax purposes.183 The question for divorce-related taxation is: at what 
point do spouses lose their tax link so that transactions between them should be 
considered as between any other unrelated taxpayers?184 This proposal places that 
separation point at divorce.
A. Tax Credit
First, this proposal contains a targeted tax credit for divorcing spouses. As 
compared to current law, a tax credit is a better way of reducing the costs of divorce. 
To the extent divorce causes unique hardship that is to be addressed by the tax code, 
this hardship is unlikely to be limited to couples with unequal incomes.185 Therefore, 
a broadly applicable tax credit could aid with the transition from marriage and 
179.     “Social Equality ‘at Home and Abroad’” was the theme of the 2014 Indiana Journal 
of Law and Social Equality Symposium where this Article was first presented.
180.     This Article does not debate whether the linkage for marriage is warranted.
181.     I.R.C. § 1041 (2012).
182.     I.R.C. § 1 (2012). 
183.     Sometimes individuals are considered together, for example with attribution rules or 
after forming partnerships or corporations. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 11, 267, 318, 701 (2012).
184.     Many Code provisions continue to treat former spouses as spouses. See I.R.C. §§ 72, 
121, 163, 220, 223, 267, 302, 318, 402, 408, 453B, 1361 (2012). 
185.     One could argue that it adds insult to injury to remove the marriage bonus at the time 
of divorce. But the removal of a possibly illegitimate benefit is an inadequate justification for 
existing favoritism.
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offset the costs of divorce. However, such a broadly applicable credit would have 
to be minimal in order to keep its cost down, and it is questionable whether the 
public would condone a credit for wealthy spouses. A more politically palatable 
alternative is a targeted tax credit for low-income divorcing spouses for a period of 
time following divorce. 
This Article does not establish an optimal amount of the credit, but argues 
for the use of a credit to replace the current tax-shifting method of tax reduction.186 
The exact amount of the credit, its refundability, and the period of time for which it 
would be available, are not theoretical questions, but political ones.187 The political 
discussion should focus on how much assistance is best provided to those in 
hardship following divorce.188
The amount of the credit might be calculated to accomplish various 
objectives. First, the amount of the credit may provide assistance to offset the 
hardship of divorce. Second, if the remainder of this proposal is adopted, Congress 
may use the credit to offset taxes owed on payments received from the other spouse 
in the divorce. Third, Congress should ensure the tax system as a whole does not 
both give and take from low-income spouses through the interaction of multiple 
credits. If this divorce-based credit simply replaces another credit that is lost, the 
credit would not reduce economic inequality or address divorce-related concerns; 
therefore, the amount or structure of the credit should compensate for the loss of 
other tax benefits. 
To curb abuse of the proposed credit, Congress may limit its availability in 
numerous ways. However, because the goal of this proposal is to help low-income 
spouses transition out of marriage, both spouses should be entitled to the credit. 
This potentially creates a financial benefit for divorce over marriage, but one that 
addresses the concerns of divorce-specific hardship. To mitigate abuse, Congress 
might limit the credit to one per taxpayer or one per marriage so that taxpayers with 
186.     Motro suggests a credit to be phased out for couples whose household income drops 
as a result of divorce, if the objective is to help mitigate divorce hardship. Motro, supra note 
170, at 685. 
187.     A smaller change requires taxation to the payer per Glenshaw Glass but not to the 
recipient, as is currently seen in Chairman David Camp’s Ways and Means Committee pro-
posals. See tax staFF, House maJorItY comm. on WaYs & means, tax reForm act oF 2014 
dIscussIon draFt 25–26, available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ways_
and_means_section_by_section_summary_final_022614.pdf. The recipient should report the 
income and claim an above-the-line deduction to offset the income to help ensure that income 
is not “lost” between the payer and the recipient. That the deduction is above-the-line allows 
the recipient to qualify for other tax expenditures based on adjusted gross income.
188.     As the credit is not tied to payments between spouses, a spouse might be willing to 
let the other spouse forego payment because the government steps in (that is, the government 
assumes the role of provider) or the spouse might be willing to take benefits in kind. This 
latter problem exists with respect to child support. Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming 
Children, 42 Wake Forest l. rev. 1029 (2007).
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multiple divorces do not benefit more than once by divorcing and remarrying.189 Or 
Congress could tie the amount of the credit to the length of the marriage, so that 
spouses who have more reason to expect a continuation of the marriage benefit the 
most. This political decision should be one that recognizes the inequality currently 
plaguing low-income divorcing spouses. 
Regardless of the chosen structure, a credit will not be without problems, 
but less so than current law. To ensure the proper political accountability of the 
credit, it is important that the value and objectives of the credit be understandable 
to the public and to recipients. Because taxation of divorcing couples should not be 
examined in isolation, but in comparison to other taxpayers, this tax expenditure 
must also be made obvious to Congress and the public to ensure the amount of the 
tax benefit is periodically reviewed. 
B. Property Divisions 
Second, this proposal removes existing tax preferences for appreciated 
property settlements, which would, in part, fund the credit. To this end, Section 
1041 of the Code would be amended. Currently, Section 1041 permits tax deferral 
on transfers of property in a divorce and, when the taxation occurs, it is taxed to 
the recipient spouse. This produces inequitably higher taxation of lower-income 
spouses when appreciated property is transferred. This proposal taxes the spouse 
who owned and controlled appreciated property.
To properly tax spouses, this proposal first ends the nonrecognition of gain 
for payers on the transfer of accumulated property. Taxation of the payer on any gain, 
with a corresponding increase in tax basis for the recipient, prevents the recipient 
from paying the tax on income enjoyed by the payer. Under a Glenshaw Glass 
conception of income, as discussed in Part II, property divisions should trigger 
taxes for the payer because the payer realizes a change in a previously untaxed 
increase in wealth.190 Thus, under this proposal, the payer would owe tax on his 
share of pre-transfer appreciation. To avoid this taxation, spouses could transfer 
property prior to divorce, which would empower the lower-income spouse before 
divorce. However, to prevent tax avoidance, transfers in the year prior to the signing 
of the divorce decree should be presumed to be the result of the divorce, and should 
be taxed as such.
Additionally, under this proposal, the receipt of property divisions should 
be partially excludible by the recipient. Under a Glenshaw Glass conception of 
income, property divisions according to spouses’ state law property interests would 
not trigger taxes for the recipient to the extent the property division is a return of a 
189.     As proof of what some couples will do for tax reduction, a couple divorced and remar-
ried repeatedly in order to file as single taxpayers. Boyter v. Comm’r, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 
1981), rev’g 74 T.C. 989 (1980).
190.     I.R.C. § 1001 (2012).
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spouse’s capital.191 In other words, if the recipient has a property interest and is just 
receiving that property interest in the divorce, there is no increase in wealth to be 
taxed. However, instead of importing state-defined property interests as the basis 
for exclusion, the federal government should permit the transfer of a couple’s assets 
(whether separate or marital) to allow each spouse to own 50% of the total assets of 
either spouse after the divorce without taxation to the recipient. 
Consider, for example, a divorce decree that provides the wife with half 
the family business that is the couple’s (and each spouse’s) only asset. If all of 
the entity’s interests are in the husband’s name, under this proposal, the receipt of 
half the business interests would not trigger current taxation to the wife, but the 
husband would owe tax on appreciation of the transferred shares.192 This prevents 
the recipient spouse from owing the tax on gain that the payer earned and controlled 
prior to the divorce.193 
For a recipient spouse to exclude the receipt of up to 50% of the couple’s 
collective property, a divorcing couple must report to the IRS their total value of 
property as of the divorce.194 Therefore, to implement this portion of the proposal, 
the IRS would require each spouse to file a form with the tax return that is due 
immediately after the divorce. Valuations are always problematic to some extent, 
but divorce is often a time when valuations are otherwise made for non-tax purposes. 
Couples who do not engage in property divisions can ignore this requirement, 
although universally mandating the reporting may be helpful to many spouses who 
lack financial information at the time of divorce.195 
Because the division under this proposal is at 50% of collective property 
(rather than basing it on state property interests), this proposal minimizes the 
problems created by the different tax treatments of community property and 
191.     Id.
192.     Any appreciation in the family home is unlikely to be taxed. Pursuant to Section 121, 
married couples can exclude $500,000 of gain on the sale of their principal residence and un-
married individuals can exclude up to $250,000 of gain. There is a two-year use and residency 
requirement for this exclusion and, in some cases, these requirements can be imputed between 
divorcing spouses. I.R.C. § 121(d)(2) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.121-4(b) (2003).
193.     If Congress taxes payers, the recipient should receive a fair market basis in the proper-
ty on a theory similar to contributions to corporations: when the shareholder pays the tax, the 
corporation does not owe the tax a second time. I.R.C. § 362 (2012). Because the payer pays 
the tax as of the transfer, the recipient takes a carryover basis plus the amount of the reported 
gain. This theory would need to be codified.
194.     Because of administrative concerns, I considered basing property divisions on the 
timing of transfers but concluded that this opened the provision to abuse and has less theoreti-
cal justification than one based on a percentage of assets. Because receiving assets soon after 
divorce would likely benefit lower income spouses, Congress might combine a timing limit 
and a percentage of assets into the definition of property divisions.
195.     This proposal decreases reliance on state law. A potential downside is that by ignoring 
state property law interests in marital property, the federal tax system may ignore real differ-
ences between spouses.
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common law regimes. Under Davis, which recognized gain on property divisions to the 
payer,196 couples of the different states received different tax treatments.197 Couples in 
community property states, but not common law states, could evenly split their marital 
property without triggering taxation because the spouses each own an interest in marital 
property. Because this proposal does not tax the recipient on up to 50% of the collective 
(and not just the community) property that she receives, this is more generous than 
community property law. 
Payers residing in community property states may be advantaged under this 
proposal because they would not be treated as transferring the half of the community 
property that previously belonged to the other spouse under community property law. 
This different tax treatment is warranted if there are real differences in property rights; 
however, these differences might cause states to adopt quasi-community property laws 
creating short-term rights for recipient spouses upon filing for divorce, as six states did 
before the enactment of Section 1041.198 To prevent states from gaming the federal tax 
system, Congress should require that divorcing spouses maintain control over (not simply 
an ownership interest in) property for a significant period (hypothetically a year) prior to 
the divorce to permit deferral of taxation. Without the prior transfer of title and control, 
the payer should be taxed on any appreciation in transferred property. This would create 
a national standard for the federal taxation of property divisions and, in the process, may 
encourage married couples to divide property more equally earlier in marriage. 
Eliminating Section 1041’s tax deferral would revive practical complications 
for payers who transfer significant amounts of appreciated property. To alleviate payers’ 
liquidity problems, they should be permitted to pay the taxes owed on an installment 
method if a form reporting the income is filed with the tax return following the finalization 
of the divorce. If the form is not properly submitted with the return, the installment method 
should not be available, and generally applicable penalties should apply. In this way, the 
government encourages the payment of taxes owed on transfers legally required to satisfy 
a personal obligation. However, it does so in a way that assists taxpayers in a period of 
transition without prioritizing the termination of marriage to the extent the government 
does today.199 
196.     United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
197.     See Karen B. Brown, The Story of Davis: Transfers of Property Pursuant to Divorce, 
in tax storIes, supra note 157, at 171. 
198.     Anti-Davis rules were created in Oregon, Illinois, Minnesota, Kansas, Missouri, and 
North Carolina. Gabinet, supra note 16, at 14 n.10.
199.     I recognize that practical elements of this plan need additional consideration but are 
beyond the scope of this Article. Consider savings plans. If savings plans are within 50% of 
the couple’s property, any built-in gain would be taxable to the payer and not taxable to the 
recipient. If savings plans are not within the 50%, they are taxed as Section 71 payments. 
Savings plans that are funded with post-tax dollars (so that the appreciation is not taxed on 
dispersal) arguably should not be taxed in either case because the appreciation is never to be 
taxed. On the other hand, savings plans that are funded with pre-tax dollars and are taxed on 
distribution should be taxed under either case (and in the latter to both spouses) because the 
appreciation is taxable.
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C. Section 71 Payments 
Third, this proposal revises current Section 71 to reflect general tax 
principles and, as a result, raises additional funding for the tax credit. Currently 
Section 71 provides a default that the recipient spouse owes tax on alimony 
payments and the payer claims an above-the-line deduction for those payments.200 
This privileges divorce because the treatment diverges from generally accepted 
tax theory by taxing one party to the payments and that is the recipient. Under 
the theory of Glenshaw Glass, both parties should owe taxes on these payments, 
because each party enjoys an increase in wealth; clearly realized, and over which 
the taxpayer has control.201 The payer uses the wealth to pay a court-mandated 
obligation, and the recipient receives and enjoys the wealth. This proposal adopts 
an approach consistent with these generally accepted principles. Coupled with the 
tax credit, this revised treatment of family law alimony payments benefits all low-
income divorcing spouses.
For purposes of this proposal, Section 71 payments are not tied to state 
law definitions or purposes for payments. Instead, under this proposal, if a spouse 
receives more than 50% of the couple’s collective property as of the divorce as 
a result of the divorce, the excess is taxed as a “Section 71 payment.” Thus, this 
proposal makes it so that the tax treatment prescribed by Section 71 is no longer 
tied to non-tax family law objectives. 202 Consequently, all payments in excess of 
property divisions are taxed consistently. Section 71 payments have either not 
been taxed prior to the divorce (for example, future earnings) or are more than the 
recipient spouse’s share of collective property.203 
This treatment is consistent with generally applicable tax rules. As discussed 
in Part I, a cornerstone of the federal income tax is that increases in wealth—clearly 
realized by the taxpayer, and over which the taxpayer has control—are treated 
200.     I.R.C. § 71 (2012).
201.     Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
202.     Although Congress is bound by state-created interests, it is not bound by state-created 
labels. See, e.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940); Morgan v. Comm’r, 309 U.S. 79 
(1940); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932); Tyler v. U.S., 281 U.S. 497 (1930); Burk-
Waggoner Oil Ass’n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925); Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144 (1924). 
But see Blair v. Comm’r, 300 U.S. 5 (1937). Congress (and subsequently the Treasury Depart-
ment) use the imported term of alimony either as shorthand or because they do not value the 
distinctions. For example, in 1944, Congress purposefully refused to use “alimony” in the 
statute because of differences between states’ laws. I.R.C. § 71 (1954). Congress stated in its 
reports that it was concerned about the uniform treatment of “amounts paid in the nature or in 
lieu of alimony.” H.r. reP. no. 77-2333, at 46, 71–72 (1942); s. reP. no. 77-1631, at 83–85 
(1942).
203.     I considered calling these “excess payments” because they are in excess of accumu-
lated property but was concerned that the term might discourage the award of, or negotiation 
for, these amounts. Malman, supra note 96, at 390–91 (discussing three options of taxation—
both, recipient, or payer—but rejecting what she sees as “double taxation”).
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as income subject to tax, unless a specific provision exempts the taxpayer from 
taxation.204 This is true even when the increase in wealth is used to pay a debt 
or satisfy an obligation. Therefore, the payer is taxed on ordinary income when 
earned income is paid to the recipient, or when any built-in appreciation in property 
is transferred to the recipient. The payer does not receive a deduction for these 
payments, because the payments are a personal expense that is not deductible without 
special congressional action, and this proposal removes the existing deduction. The 
recipient is also taxed on receipt of the payments because the payments represent 
an increase in the recipient’s wealth. Recipients are currently taxed this way if the 
payer pays alimony while both of the former spouses continue to live in a single 
household, a tax arrangement which has been publicized in the news.205
By making the tax treatment of property divisions and Section 71 payments 
conditioned upon tax principles rather than state family law objectives, some current 
tax complications for alimony are eliminated. No longer is the form of payment 
critical to its tax treatment. The form of payment as either property divisions or 
Section 71 payments (whether as a lump sum or as periodic payments) does not 
matter from the tax perspective, because taxation is made dependent upon whether 
the amounts are representative of previously taxed amounts.206 Form generally only 
has meaning in tax if (1) a tax benefit is made contingent upon the form of payment 
or (2) it is necessary for the administration of the tax system.207 Neither of these 
need apply in the divorce context. 
It is important to note that because Section 71 payments are taxed to both 
parties, additional government revenue is raised during a time of distress for the 
taxpayers involved. Under this proposal, the increase in taxation is offset by a tax 
credit for low-income, but not all, divorcing taxpayers. This eliminates one benefit 
of marriage that only exists for some married couples. Same-sex couples who 
cannot marry, and others who are not in the favored marital group, have long been 
paying this second layer of tax, unless their transfers are recognized as gifts.208 
204.     Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431.
205.     See, e.g., Kerry Hannon, Taxes and Divorce: 6 Tips for Women, ForBes (Mar. 7, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2013/03/07/taxes-and-divorce-6-tips-for-women/.; 
Alimony: Tax Planning, dIvorce educ. center n.J. (Nov. 19, 2012, 4:36 AM), https://web.
archive.org/web/20121119043605/http://www.decnj.org/articles/Alimony_Tax.html (accessed 
using the Internet Archive index).
206.     It is beyond the scope of this Article to determine whether there should be tracing 
requirements or whether it is sufficient for property divisions to be of an equal value.
207.     Gregory v. Helvering established the doctrine of substance over form, which requires 
that taxpayers are bound by the substance of a transaction rather than its legal form. 293 U.S. 
465 (1935).
208.     Transfers between married spouses and between divorcing spouses are excluded from 
the gift tax. I.R.C. §§ 2523, 2516 (2012).
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D. Child-Based Benefits 
Fourth, this proposal imposes few changes to existing child-related tax benefits. 
Current law only taxes payers of child support, and allows children to be “transferred” 
for purposes of claiming some, but not all, child-based benefits without transferring 
physical custody. This proposal retains the former taxation scheme but removes the 
latter elective feature. The goal is to eliminate the transferability that exists for some 
child-related tax benefits, while encouraging the payment of child support, as compared 
to other forms of support. The result would be significantly more administrable child 
support and child-based benefits for both taxpayers and the government.
As is the law today, this proposal taxes child support to the payer because 
the payments are for the benefit of his or her own child. This provides certainty 
for child support, but payments are likely taxed to the higher-income, support-
paying parent and not the lower-income, support-receiving parent. Although there 
are arguments that Glenshaw Glass should require the recipient parent also report 
the income when the recipient has the ability to determine how the money is spent, 
there is a counterargument that the income does not increase the recipient’s income, 
but instead increases the income of the child. The more convincing argument is 
that any alternative would work to increase the economic inequality of low-income 
children due child support. 
The treatment of child support is more favorable under this proposal (as 
compared to Section 71 payments) because child support is only taxed to the payer, 
producing a collective tax reduction that is enjoyed by the recipient.209 Unlike 
under existing law, the reduction is in the hands of the recipient, care-giving spouse 
(generally the less wealthy spouse, although not necessarily). This beneficial 
treatment creates a potential inequity between those with children and those 
without, because only the former enjoy the implicit election to frame payments as 
child support rather than as Section 71 payments.
Through its relatively favorable tax treatment, this proposal incentivizes 
the expansion of child support, in spite of the pressure today to minimize taxable 
child support.210 Moreover, deemphasizing the importance of labels as to tax 
consequences, payments should be taxable as child support to the greater of (1) state 
minimum guidelines for child support or (2) amounts labeled as child support, and 
the termination of which is tied to an event related to the child. The former assists 
ill-advised couples who frame payments as family support without differentiating 
payments between those for a former spouse and those for a child. To the extent 
209.     Although there is a benefit for child support as compared to other forms of transfers, 
the tax benefit is not as great as simply not paying. This proposal creates no incentive to pay 
consistent with current law because it would privilege child support over payment for custo-
dial children.
210.     A non-tax preference for child support (rather than alimony) already occurs in family 
law.
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payments would qualify as child support under state law, payments should be taxed 
as such. The latter provision encourages payments to be labeled as child support, 
and therefore (hopefully) viewed as such.211 
This proposal also advocates for the provision of child-based benefits to 
the custodial parent, regardless of which parent provides the child the greatest 
amount of financial support.212 In other words, to increase the likelihood that child-
based tax benefits provide for the child, if either parent provides half of the child’s 
financial support, the custodial parent is entitled to all of the child’s tax benefits.213 
Thus, even if the noncustodial parent provided all of the child’s financial assistance, 
that parent would not be entitled to child-based tax benefits. Through this revision, 
Congress provides tax aid to the direct benefit of the child, rather than reducing 
the economic cost of financial expenditures for the child. Removing current law’s 
choice as to who receives some child-based benefits may harm parents to the extent 
that tax reduction is the goal. Nevertheless, linking child-based tax benefits more 
directly to the child furthers the goal of providing for the child.
Complications may exist in the operation of this rule due to shared custody. 
If parents are awarded shared physical custody, the tax benefits should be divided 
between parents according to the ratio of their custody, as long as the parents, 
collectively, would be eligible for these tax benefits. This default eliminates the need 
for allocations based on financial support or calculations of actual parenting time.
Prior attempts to allocate children’s personal exemptions and related tax 
benefits based on financial support were not administrable.214 At different times, the 
statute required that a parent contribute a specified amount to a child’s care, or at 
least relatively more than the other spouse contributed, in order to receive the tax 
benefits associated with the child.215 Information deficits pervaded both systems. 
As noted by Congress, tests based on the amount of support created problems for 
parents and the IRS alike, especially when each parent believed he or she met the 
211.     The collective tax reduction creates a tax incentive for payment of child support over 
Section 71 payments, but only if spouses understand the tax savings. It also creates an incen-
tive for the payer to negotiate to capture some of the savings. That payments must terminate 
on an event related to the child imposes a cost on the implicit election to frame payments as 
child support rather than as Section 71 payments. 
212.     If parents debate custody solely to seek a child’s tax advantages (for example, exemp-
tion and certain credits), there is a much larger problem in society.
213.     If it is now acceptable to sever tax relief from both financial and custodial care of 
children, why should Congress limit the ability to transfer to those who are the parents of the 
child?
214.     H.r. reP. no. 98-861, at 1118 (1984) (Conf. Rep.); H.r. reP. no. 98-432, pt. 2, at 
1494 (1984); H.r. reP. no. 77-2333, at 46 (1942).
215.     For example, in 1966 a taxpayer could claim a dependent if half of the person’s sup-
port was provided by the taxpayer and the person was under nineteen, had less than $600 of 
gross income, was the child of the taxpayer, and was a student. I.R.C. §§ 152(a), (e)(1)(B) 
(1964).
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requirements.216 Angry former spouses often made it difficult to prove who satisfied 
the test.217 Similar problems of proof would exist if parents had to provide records 
of how many days each retained custody of the child. Therefore, basing entitlement 
to benefits on the terms of the divorce agreement is preferred, even if this approach 
is not perfect.
Some may object to basing tax consequences on custody agreements, 
especially if the agreement does not reflect how custody actually plays out. 
However, similar inequity may result from the existing policy of trading benefits, 
as discussed in Part II. Moreover, these complaints are more appropriately directed 
at a couple’s divorce agreement rather than at the tax system. For example, an ex-
spouse may complain that, despite having technically entered into a joint-custody 
arrangement, she alone provides all of the financial assistance for a child, and she 
actually maintains sole physical custody. The problem for this spouse is not the 
tax consequences of the divorce decree’s arrangement—it is the fact that the legal 
arrangement does not reflect the reality of her situation. Just because her divorce 
agreement is inaccurate does not mean the tax system for everyone should be 
changed in a way that would create an equitable result in her case. If anything, the 
tax results should encourage family law to create agreements that are accurate.
A proposal that minimizes choice while focusing on custody of the child 
reduces tax gamesmanship and centers the tax benefits on the most important 
beneficiary—the child. In a world of low child support payment rates,218 this 
proposal severs the tax benefit from the collective tax reduction of the parents, 
and gives the benefit to the custodial parent. To the extent the system errs, it errs 
in favor of the child. The fact that more revenue might go to the government (and 
increased government revenue only occurs if the couple would have benefited from 
tax shifting) should not prevent Congress from re-focusing the benefit on the person 
for whom the system was created.
E. Not a Divorce Penalty 
This proposal is premised on the theory that when spouses break the bonds 
of marriage, the tax benefits associated with marriage that are enjoyed by some (but 
not all) couples should also terminate. If one accepts this theory, this proposal is not 
a tax increase for any newly divorcing couple. Instead, for some couples, divorce 
is the removal of a tax benefit favoring marriage; for others it is the removal of a 
marriage penalty. Regardless, divorce is the termination of special recognition of 
the marital relationship, and it puts former spouses on the same terms as if they 
216.     s. reP. no. 90-488, at 2 (1967).
217.     See id. at 2–3. See also Nassau, supra note 68, at 97.
218.     See supra note 42.
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had not married.219 Nevertheless, despite the fact that divorce is an event that 
intentionally breaks the links of marriage, there may be social, economic, and 
political reasons to mitigate any tax imposed at the time of the divorce. Under this 
theory, any mitigation of tax in the event of a divorce is a tax expenditure and not 
required of the tax system. 
Despite some current political support for eliminating the deduction for the 
payer of alimony,220 taxation of both payer and recipient is likely to be unpopular. 
Some critics may claim that it creates unacceptable double taxation, particularly 
because the obligation arises from a former marital unit. However, once the marital 
bond is broken and former spouses are treated as separate taxpayers, this application 
of the tax is the logical result. This harmonizes the tax consequences of Section 71 
payments with the payment of any other debt. Additionally, this increased taxation 
may work to decrease inequality within marriage. The possibility of taxation to 
both spouses upon divorce may motivate some couples to divide property before 
the relationship’s termination, and therefore empower the lower-earning spouse.
 Not everyone will agree with the interpretation of Glenshaw Glass as often 
requiring taxation to both spouses.221 Although there is unlikely to be debate as to 
the taxation of the payer, there is likely to be some reluctance to accept taxation of 
the recipient. In a different context, one scholar has argued that all noncommercial 
activities should be exempt from tax.222 By extension, the recipient of transfers 
from former spouses would not be taxed because the activity is not commercial. 
Another argument against taxing the recipient can be made on general public policy 
grounds. The difficulty with this exclusion is similar to those discussed in Part II: 
exclusion is a large tax benefit, not tied to need or ability to pay, that advantages 
divorce and therefore marriage. 
Certain characterizations of a transfer resulting from divorce, either as 
a detached-and-disinterested gift or as support, would provide a narrower basis 
for exclusion. To the extent payments’ tax treatment is dependent upon their 
characterization, the system invites litigation and gamesmanship because, without a 
219.     One could argue we should adopt a standard that relates the tax treatment of divorce-
related payments back to the original cause of the payments—marriage. However, while that 
standard might determine the character of income, it should not also affect the timing of the 
income. To allow the prior relationship to defer taxation shifts the taxpayer in addition to 
changing the amount and possibly character of that tax. 
220.     See tax staFF, supra note 187. Unlike this Article’s proposal, however, the proposal 
by the Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee would allow the recipient to exclude 
the payments from reported income. Id.
221.     For example, Marjorie Kornhauser suggests that based on the theory that marriage is a 
partnership, divorce should be taxed as the liquidation of that partnership. Marjorie E. Korn-
hauser, Theory Versus Reality: The Partnership Model of Marriage in Family and Income Tax 
Law, 69 temP. l. rev. 1413, 1422–23 (1996).
222.     Douglas A. Kahn, Exclusion from Income of Compensation for Services and Pooling 
of Labor Occurring in a Noncommercial Setting, 11 Fla. tax rev. 683 (2011).
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specific basis for exclusion, the default is inclusion as gross income to the recipient. 
However, fitting payments within these rigid classifications is difficult, due to the 
lack of a ‘perfect fit.’ Payments received by a recipient are unlikely to be labeled 
as compensation because of the unsavoriness of deciding exactly what services 
spouses perform. If payments are a gift, they are excludible under Section 102; 
however, as discussed in Part II, to the extent there is a court order requiring payment, 
these payments do not appear to have the requisite “detached and disinterested 
generosity.” If payments are legally required support, they might be excluded on 
other public policy grounds, as are child support and welfare payments; however, 
without a statutory basis, this expansion of support could prove to be a dangerous 
slippery slope. 
Common justifications for other exclusions from taxable income do not 
apply in the divorce context. Many tax provisions defer or eliminate taxation because 
taxpayers have a continuity of investment that is not broken in the transaction.223 
Divorce, however, intentionally breaks the continuity of a marriage. In divorce, the 
purpose of the transfer is to permit spouses to change to a new, different status. Thus, 
the rights enjoyed in marriage are not of the same kind as the property received on 
divorce.224 Similarly, Congress is not attempting to encourage a particular behavior. 
Divorce is unlike the largely untaxed sale of a principal residence because, in the 
latter case, Congress desires to encourage the status of home ownership.225 With 
property settlements, the tax is not eliminated, but is instead deferred and shifted 
between taxpayers to preserve taxation in order to not encourage divorce.
Despite the lack of a theoretical alternative, taxing the recipient of some 
portion of property settlements may be disconcerting to some.226 If a recipient does 
not previously have a property interest in what she receives in the divorce, the divorce 
payment increases her income and that increase in wealth is generally taxable. 
Consider a couple, Wilma and Hank, whose only accumulated asset is a business 
worth $100,000, in which they are equal owners. Wilma is awarded the business 
in the divorce. Wilma had a property interest in one-half of the business before the 
divorce. Receipt of that one-half of the business is not taxable to Wilma or Hank. For 
the remaining half of the business transferred to Wilma, under this proposal not only 
is Hank taxed on any appreciation on its disposition, Wilma is also taxed on receiving 
the second half of the business. Wilma is taxed because she is made better off by the 
half of the business that she was not otherwise entitled to.227
223.     I.R.C. §§ 351, 721, 1031, 1033 (2012).
224.     See e.g., I.R.C. § 1031.
225.     I.R.C. § 121 (2012).
226.     Congress should require a tax filing at divorce estimating property valuation that 
might bring tax consequences to divorcing spouses’ minds. 
227.     Although deferral may mitigate the couple’s tax pain by decreasing taxes on the payer, 
in doing so it puts couples with appreciated assets in a better situation than those with liquid 
savings and puts divorcing couples in a better position than other taxpayers.
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This taxation of payer and recipient currently applies if the couple had not been 
married. Two friends, Fran and Filip, jointly own a business and, after a fight, they 
sue each other. A court requires them to terminate joint ownership in their business, 
which has appreciated in value. If Fran sells her interest to Filip, Fran has income 
equal to any appreciation in her half of the business transferred to Filip. Moreover, 
Filip was taxed when he earned the income that he uses to buy Fran’s half of the 
business. If Fran “gives” her interest to Filip after the lawsuit, she is still taxed on the 
appreciation, and Filip has income equal to the value of that half because the transfer 
is not a gift per Duberstein.228 
Therefore, looking at the recipient as part of a larger group of all taxpayers in 
need, this proposal’s baseline taxation is necessary to guarantee equal treatment of all 
taxpayers. In divorce, spouses with little earning potential may be given more than 50% 
of the couple’s collective property. The fact that the allocation is made with the hopes 
of aiding a spouse in an unfortunate situation does not mean the tax results should be 
more beneficial than those extended to other taxpayers. If the recipient spouse stole 
the money, won it in a lottery, or found it in a piano, the money would be income and 
subject to tax as gross income.229 If the recipient spouse were given a skill at the divorce 
settlement to earn money, the earnings would be taxed. The fact that the income is 
generated via divorce cannot change the result without unfairly privileging divorced 
spouses over other taxpayers. We might wish that there was more marital property so 
that poor spouses are relieved of hardship, but providing divorcing spouses greater aid 
than that provided to other poor individuals is an inequitable targeting of tax relief.
Underlying this proposal is the premise that tax should not drive the framing 
of divorce payments, and that tax policy should not be sacrificed simply because 
there is a divorce. Following this premise, the tax treatment of divorce-related events 
should be evaluated independently of the family law results. It might be “absurd 
to think” that we can separate taxation from the social and psychological issues;230 
however, the difficulty of the endeavor makes it no less worthy. The alternative is that 
valuable tax principles might be lost in favor of state law, without fully appreciating 
the sacrifice.231 
228.     Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
229.     Paul v. Comm’r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 955 (1992); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14 (as amended in 
1993). See also Cesarini v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
230.     Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 stan. l. rev. 1389, 
1421 (1975).
231.     For example, focusing on taxation may cause a divorce agreement, which does not 
produce the largest collective tax reduction, to be perceived as a miscarriage of the tax 
system. That incorrectly suggests taxation should follow the dictates of state family law. If 
the tax rules are created according to fairly applied principles, divorce agreement A produces 
tax result A instead of result B because agreement A is not substantively the same as agree-
ment B. If a couple or a family court judge chooses agreement A instead of agreement B, tax 
consequences should follow. It is tax-centric or tax-phobic to argue that if tax result A is better 
for the couple than tax result B, the court and the couple should choose A instead of B or that 
B should be taxed as A because there is greater tax reduction.
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This proposal eliminates the existing benefit for tax shifting and the elections 
often necessary to produce it. Moreover, it simplifies tax law both for divorcing 
couples and the government.  In the process, it ensures that those with the greatest 
need receive the largest tax reduction. The use of a tax credit strengthens, and 
makes obvious, the link between the tax benefit and its intended object. Of course, 
not all complexity is eliminated but, with adoption of this proposal, the structure of 
choices would work to the benefit of the least advantaged. 
conclusIon
For much of the history of the income tax, Congress has designated divorce 
as an event that deserves tax reduction, and Congress is likely to continue targeted 
tax reduction programs for some (but not all) couples in divorce. Because the current 
law’s tax savings is captured by a relatively small group of divorcing couples, the 
benefiting couples and their representatives have an economic incentive to resist 
changes to the law. In addition, a widespread sensitivity to the economic need 
of many divorced spouses makes it difficult to adopt a system without special 
recognition for divorce. 
Nevertheless, divorce-related tax provisions that deviate from general 
tax policies are a tax expenditure, which can or cannot be targeted to accomplish 
its objective. When shaping this tax expenditure, Congress should focus any tax 
reduction for divorcing couples on those in need, rather than seeing these provisions 
as just another grant of tax reduction, often to wealthy couples. Recasting the issue 
highlights the underlying question of whether Congress has created divorce-related 
tax rules that address the potential hardships of divorce. 
With existing provisions, Congress assumes that divorcing spouses will, and 
should, engage in effective tax planning. Existing divorce-related tax provisions 
form a complicated set of rules that often require spouses to have knowledge of tax, 
work together, and anticipate future income and future changes in the law. These 
rules are “difficult for lawyers to apply . . . intelligently and even more difficult for 
their clients to understand . . . .”232 Divorcing couples are advised not to do the tax 
planning themselves. It was reported in Forbes that even “your divorce lawyer may 
not be competent to address [the relevant] tax rules so you may need a tax advisor.”233 
While some couples can use divorce as a tax reduction tool, many couples may be 
harmed by rules that are not intended for their individual circumstances, and some 
that could benefit may not have the tools to plan properly.
232.     See Hjorth, supra note 96, at 187 (arguing for choice regarding support and nonreal-
ization).
233.     Robert W. Wood, How to Make Divorce Less Taxing, ForBes (June 11, 2010, 4:22 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/06/11/divorce-taxes-alimony-child-support-personal-
finance-robert-wood.html.
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This complexity exists because academics and Congress have been too 
cute in structuring existing relief. They have assumed that all couples benefit by 
the existing regime, and that divorce attorneys understand the tax law and can 
effectively explain it to divorcing couples in the midst of their divorce. Focusing on 
economic need rather than tax reduction demands that tax shifting and elections not 
be the basis of divorce-related taxation. Congress creates little benefit for the poor 
by giving them flexibility when they do not owe taxes or when they cannot benefit 
from a difference in tax rates. 
This Article’s proposal eliminates underlying flaws of the present system 
and, in its place, creates a default recognizable as congressional aid to those in 
need. The proposed tax relief targets low-income spouses with a tax credit at the 
time of the divorce, and generally applicable law still applies in the divorce context. 
Reducing choice and planning opportunities focuses the tax reduction, instead of 
allowing it to be grabbed by those who successfully use their choices. Thus, tax 
relief is given based on need and not greed.234
234.     As a final note, there is nothing mandating that any tax preference be granted upon 
divorce. Congress could apply traditional tax policies to all of these payments and provide 
any assistance to divorcing couples through more direct means. Not everything has to be done 
through the tax code.
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